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BREACH NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE
EUROPEAN UNION LEGAL
FRAMEWORK: CONVERGENCE,
CONFLICTS, AND COMPLEXITY IN
COMPLIANCE*
SAMSON YOSEPH ESAYAS†
ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) legal landscape on data privacy and information security is undergoing significant changes. A prominent legislative development in recent years is the introduction of breach notification requirements within a number of regulatory instruments. In only
the past two years, the Community legislator has adopted, and proposed, four different regulatory instruments containing breach notification requirements. There are also existing requirements for the telecom
sector. This creates a complex mesh of regulatory frameworks for
breach notification where different aspects of the same breach within
the same company might have to be dealt with under different regulatory instruments, making compliance with such requirements challenging. In this article, the existing and en route breach notification requirements under the EU legal framework are examined – elaborating
their potential areas of convergence or conflict and the resulting complexity in compliance with such requirements. To this end, the article
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examines the scope of the notification regimes, the types of breaches,
when a breach is considered to occur under the relevant rules, and the
relevant requirements to notify stakeholders. Furthermore, the article
examines why a proactive approach to compliance with breach notification requirements is essential and suggests the need to address breach
notification requirements in conjunction with security risk analysis,
which is being mandated in most of the regulatory instruments.
1. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in technology and the Internet are significantly
changing the way people behave and interact – making day-to-day life
easier and more efficient. However, such developments also bring their
own concerns. Privacy and security are at the forefront of such concerns, both for individuals as well as for businesses. According to a survey, four out of five Europeans are concerned about the recording of
their behavior and feel a loss of control over their privacy. 1 Similarly,
91% of Americans ―‗agree‘ or ‗strongly agree‘ that consumers have lost
control over how personal information is collected and used by companies.‖2
From the business side, ―three out of four respondents to a…survey
said information security and privacy have become significant areas of
concern.‖3 Information security breaches are commonplace, with 57% of
respondents to European Commission study experiencing incidents that
had a ―serious impact on their activities.‖ 4 Such incidents would negatively affect the economic and financial wellbeing of the companies. 5
Nonetheless, economic and financial losses are not the only reasons for
concern over security and privacy. Organizations are equally concerned

1. EUROPEAN COMM‘N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 359: ATTITUDES ON DATA
PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: REPORT 2 (2011),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf.
2. Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden
Era, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/publicprivacy-perceptions/.
3. HARVARD BUS. REV., MEETING THE CYBER RISK CHALLENGE: REPORT 1 (2012),
available
at
http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/publicsector/Meeting%20the%20Cyber%20Risk%20Challenge%20%20Harvard%20Business%20Review%20-%20Zurich%20Insurance%20group.pdf.
4. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Measures to Ensure a High Common Level of Network and Information Security
Across the Union 2, COM (2013) 48 final (Feb. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Proposed NIS Directive].
5. For example, the global average cost of data breach is estimated to be around
$136 per record. See PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2013 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL
ANALYSIS
1
(May
2013),
available
at
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2013%20Report%20GLOBAL%20CODB%20FIN
AL%205-2.pdf.

2014]

E.U. BREACH NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

319

about the legal and regulatory threats resulting from security breaches
and non-compliance with privacy rules. Three out of the top five concerns of respondents to the Harvard Business Review survey are related
to legal and regulatory issues. 6 In particular, more than half of the respondents cited the upcoming data protection rules in the EU and ―almost half cit[ed] a proposed breach notification requirement.‖7 This is
particularly important given the size of the financial penalties for
breaching these rules. The proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) introduces a penalty up to 100 Million Euro or 5% of global
annual turnover should organizations fail to comply with the regulatory
requirements, including data breach notification requirements. 8 In light
of such heightened concerns and heavy sanctions, investing in compliance should become a priority for undertakings. This article seeks to
contribute to the achievement of organizations‘ compliance with such
requirements by examining the breach notification requirements under
the EU legal framework.
Compelling organizations to provide notice of a breach is a specific
example of ―‗regulation through disclosure,‘ which [is] termed as ‗one of
the most striking developments‘ in the last [few decades.]‖ 9 Such development is associated with the ―‗communit[ies] right to know‘ laws,
which were developed in order to improve the efficacy of environmental
laws[,]‖10 breach notification laws have a similar essence.
In the U.S., the first breach notification law took effect in California
in 2003 and currently, 47 States, 3 territories, and the District of Columbia have enacted data breach notification laws. 11 There are also additional state and federal level breach notification requirements target6. HARVARD BUS. REV., supra note 3, at 5.
7. Id.
8. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 92, COM (2012) 11 final
(Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter GDPR]. Article 79(6) of the initial Commission draft provides
for a penalty of 1 Million Euro or 2% of the annual worldwide turnover but the proposed
amendment from the Parliament increases this figure to 100 Million Euro or 5% of the
annual worldwide turnover. See Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs, art.
79(2a)(c), Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data at 173 (Nov. 21, 2013) [hereinafter LIBE Draft], available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-0402+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
9. Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches,
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 955 (2007).
10. Jane K. Winn, Are Better Security Breach Notification Laws Possible, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133, 1166 (2009).
11. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT‘L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan.
12,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
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ing certain industries ―such as banking, credit unions, insurance, and
health care.‖12 On average, the penalties for non-compliance with such
laws range from ―$500 to $1,000 per person whose data is compromised,
and some providing for trebling of damages for willful noncompliance.‖13 A federal level notification regime for personal data is
under consideration in the U.S. Congress.14
In Australia, the Privacy Amendment Bill that took effect in March
2014 introduced mandatory data breach notification at the federal level.
The Bill requires entities to ―notify… affected individuals and the Privacy Commissioner‖ of breaches ―that would result in serious harm to
[an] individual.‖15 Failure to comply with the provisions could result ―in
penalties of up to 1.7 million AUD for companies and 340,000 AUD for
individuals.‖16 In a recent amendment to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, Canada introduced a breach notification requirement.17 According to the amendment, businesses and
organizations are required to report to consumers and the privacy
commissioner breaches that pose a ―real risk of significant harm to an
individual[.]‖18 Non-compliance with the requirements could lead to
fines up to $100,000 including potential public announcement of noncompliance.19
Across the EU, until recent legislative initiatives, breach notification requirements were only limited to the areas of the telecom sector. 20
12. WORLD LAW GROUP, GLOBAL GUIDE TO DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS 119 (1st
ed. 2013), available at http://www.theworldlawgroup.com/Document.asp?DocID=113469.
13. Fred H. Cate, Information Security Breaches: Looking Back & Thinking Ahead,
CENTRE FOR INFO. POL‘Y LEADERSHIP, HUNTON AND WILLIAMS LLP (2008), available at
http://www.hunton.com/files/Publication/5ad823e3-6eee-45e2-8366b9a32e197b81/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0a2c3d3f-0aa9-497f-8079099d431ce4fe/Information_Security_Breaches_Cate.pdf.
14. Mauricio F. Paez et al., U.S. Congress Ready to Enact Data Security and Breach
Notification Rules after Recent Consumer Data Breaches, JONES DAY PUBL‘NS (Feb. 20,
2014),
http://www.jonesday.com/us-congress-ready-to-enact-data-security-and-breachnotification-rules-after-recent-consumer-data-breaches-02-14-2014/.
15. WORLD LAW GROUP, supra note 12, at 4.
16. Id.
17. Emily Chung, New privacy rules target data breaches, fraud, CBCNEWS (Apr.
9,
2014),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/new-privacy-rules-target-data-breachesfraud-1.2604552; Digital Privacy Act, 2013-14, S. OF CAN. Bill [S-4] (Can.) available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=
6524312&File=33#3.
18. Digital Privacy Act, 2013-14, S. OF CAN. Bill [S-4] cl. 10.2 (Can.) available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=
6524312&File=33#3.
19. Chung, supra note 17.
20. However, different Member States have long implemented general data breach
notification requirements or requirements targeting a specific sector in their domestic
law. For example, the German and Spanish implementations of the Data Protection Directive contain breach notification requirements for controllers of personal data.
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Mandatory breach notification requirements within the telecom sector
go as far back as the 2002 ePrivacy Directive. 21 However, it was the
2009 telecom reform, which brought a comprehensive legal framework
for breach notification, including mandatory personal data breach notifications. In the past two years, there have been significant legislative
initiatives regarding breach notifications within the EU. In June 2013,
the EU passed Regulation 611/2013, 22 complementing and harmonizing
data breach notification requirements by public electronic communications service providers, including both traditional telecom providers
such as telephony companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). In
February 2013, the Commission placed a proposal for a Directive on
Network and Information Security (NIS), 23 which contains breach notification requirements for many entities under the name of ‗market operators‘ such as financial, health, and transport service providers. Furthermore, the Commission released its proposal for the data protection
Regulation in 2012,24 which contains a mandatory breach notification
requirement for actors processing personal data of EU residents. Further, in July 2014, the Regulation on electronic identification and trust
services (eIDAS)25 was adopted and introduces breach notification requirement for trust service providers, which could range from telecoms
service providers, to banks and other financial institutions, or even universities.
The existence of such an array of breach notification requirements
within the EU means that an organization might be required to notify
for different aspects of the same breach under different notification regimes, creating significant administrative and financial burden for multinational companies. ―This is because for example, in some [EU] countries security and privacy breaches [in the] electronic communications
services are dealt with by the telecom regulator.‖ 26 Whereas some other

21. Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) (ePrivacy Directive).
22. Commission Regulation 611/2013, of 24 June 2013 on the Measures Applicable
to the Notification of Personal Data Breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2013 O.J. (L
173) 2 (EU).
23. Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4.
24. GDPR, supra note 8.
25. Regulation 910/2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July
2014 on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the
Internal Market and Repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73 (EU) (eIDAS
Regulation).
26. Dr. Marnix Dekker et al., Cyber Incident Reporting in the EU: An overview of security articles in EU legislation, EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY 5 (Aug. 2012),
available
at
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidentsreporting/cyber-incident-reporting-in-the-eu/at_download/fullReport.
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countries require the privacy breaches to be reported ―separately to the
data protection authorities, or to national cyber security [authorities].‖ 27
This could lead to a situation where a Pan-European Telecom company
might have to notify a telecom sector regulator, a personal data protection regulator, and a general cyber security regulator, potentially in different timeframes and with differing levels of formality. Similarly, providers such as Paypal might have to provide notice of breaches under
the proposed GDPR, the NIS Directive, and the eIDAS Regulation.
Apart from the resulting administrative and financial burdens of such
compliance, it is not always easy for an organization to determine when
a breach is considered to have occurred, whether the breach affects personal data, and whether the conditions for notifying the authorities and
the individual have been fulfilled.
In this article, the breach notification requirements under the EU
legal framework will be examined, elaborating their potential areas of
convergence or conflict and the resulting complexity in compliance with
such requirements. Given the short timeframes for notification and the
fact that the breach has to be notified during a potential crisis period
within the organization, non-compliance could easily occur. This calls
for a comprehensive approach to dealing with breach notification requirements where organizations understand and address such issues in
advance, examine the types of breaches that require notification, the
parties to be notified (authority or/and individuals), the formalities required, and taking steps to comply with these requirements beforehand.
For this reason, the article suggests that organizations are better placed
if they can align and integrate their breach notification compliance into
the overall risk management framework and their security risk analysis
in particular. Such an approach enables organizations to assess which
of the identified security risks might trigger the breach notification requirements and put all the appropriate measures in place. This general
approach is particularly relevant given that most breach notification
regimes require organizations to conduct security risk assessments.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the rationales behind breach notification requirements, followed by a discussion of the notification regimes within the EU in Section 3. Section 4 highlights the significance of aligning breach
notification compliance with security risk analysis. The article then
concludes with some observations.
2. RATIONALE BEHIND AND CHALLENGES OF BREACH
NOTIFICATION REGIMES
Compelling entities to disclose a breach carries two major objec-

27.

Id.
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tives: ex ante (in terms of shaping the future behavior of the entities)
and ex post (in terms of increased effectiveness in mitigating the harm
of the breach). In its ex ante rationale, disclosing a breach imposes a
reputational cost on the entity subject to breach and the potential negative publicity serves as an incentive for operators to identify more effective methods of security including an increase in security budgets. 28
This, in turn, is believed to drive forward the market for data security
technology.29 In this regard, data breach notification requirements reinforce another fundamental principle of data privacy within the EU,
which is the principle of data security. Somehow related to this rationale is the claim that breach notification enhances an organization‘s
transparency and accountability thereby improving an organization‘s
ability to respond to an incident. Notification of breaches could also be
relevant from public policy perspective in the sense that the relevant
authorities will be able to learn where policy interventions and cooperation might be required. Nonetheless, frequent notifications are less likely to enhance organizations‘ security efforts and could also dry up regulatory authorities‘ resources.
In serving its ex post objective, breach notification can help both
customers and entities mitigate the harm caused by the breach. On the
one hand, organizations will respond more ―effectively and vigorously to
a breach due to increased public and regulatory scrutiny of its practices.‖30 On the other hand, it allows affected individuals to mitigate the
damages of the breach. In this regard, breach notification regimes often
strive to achieve this objective by compelling the notifying organization
to suggest some measures in order to mitigate the harm. Furthermore,
the notification of breaches to individuals reinforces the right to information, which is a fundamental principle of the EU legal framework. 31
28. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment: Accompanying document to the Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the
Council amending European Parliament and Council Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC
and 202/21/EC Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the
Council amending European Parliament and Council Directives 2002/22/EC and
2002/58/EC Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council establishing the European Electronic Communications Markets Authority, {COM
(2007) 697 final, COM(2007) 698 final, COM (2007) 699 final, SEC (2007) 1472 final}, SEC
(2007) 1473 final [hereinafter Impact Assessment].
29. EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A METHODOLOGY
OF THE ASSESSMENT OF SEVERITY OF PERSONAL DATA BREACHES 1 (Clara Galan Manso &
Sławomir Górniak eds., 2013), available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identityand-trust/library/deliverables/dbn-severity/at_download/fullReport.
30. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9 at 936.
31. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46, art. 10-11, of 23 November 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of
such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (Data Protection Directive). Particularly Recital 39
recognizes the right of individual to be informed when data about him/her is disclosed to
third parties. Id.
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In reality, notifying individuals of breaches has failed to provoke the
desired behavior from consumers either because of the communication,
with 61% of consumers having problems understanding the notification,
or because consumers are not paying attention to the notices they receive.32
Another major challenge on the effective implementation of breach
notification requirements is disclosure disincentives. This is related to
the lack of sufficient positive incentives and public resources in such
laws that encourage disclosure and ―increase the probability of apprehension and conviction for failures to report breaches.‖ 33 This implies
that if the probability of detecting unreported breaches is low, organization would be deterred from disclosing breaches that could subject them
to enormous financial penalties. This is just beyond a theoretical claim.
A survey of 300 security professionals across Europe shows that ―only
2% of surveyed EU companies are willing to go public if they suffer a
security breach‖ and only ―38% are willing to inform the relevant authorities.‖34 Similarly, a study from the U.S. shows that only 11% of security breaches are actually reported.35 The disclosure disincentive is
particularly a challenge with the growing trend for adopting cloud computing services where organizations under such obligation use third
party providers to perform certain tasks. The fact that these third parties might not be under similar notification obligations means the disclosure disincentive is especially strong in such cases. 36 In the EU, recent legislative initiatives seem to consider such disincentive by
imposing notification obligations on such third parties.37
Furthermore, breach notification requirements, particularly those
involving notification to individuals are considered as counterproductive and that give rise to ―notification fatigue.‖38 On the one
hand, organizations may be forced to comply with such requirements
rather than spending resources on the actual remedying of the breach
sustained. For this reason, there are suggestions that incident response
32. PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2012 CONSUMER STUDY ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION
10
(June
2012),
available
at
http://www.experian.com/assets/databreach/brochures/ponemon-notification-study-2012.pdf.
33. Winn, supra note 10, at 1144; see also Cate, supra note 13.
34. Breach Notification is Now EU Law for Communications Providers, INFO
SECURITY
(Aug.
29,
2013),
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/breachnotification-is-now-eu-law-for/.
35. Thomas Claburn, Most Security Breaches Go Unreported, INFORMATIONWEEK
(Jul. 31, 2008), http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/most-security-breachesgo-unreported/d/d-id/1070576?.
36. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 936.
37. See infra Section 0 for more detail.
38. EUR. CONSUMER ORG., E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE: PERSONAL DATA BREACH
NOTIFICATION 2 (2011), available at http://www.beuc.org/publications/2011-09742-01e.pdf.
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rather than incident reporting should be prioritized under such laws.39
Moreover, breach notification regimes might actually disadvantage organizations with substantial investment in security. As Winn notes,
spotting a breach requires some kind of sophistication where ―smaller
and less sophisticated organizations might not even realize they are suffering security breaches.‖40 This is particularly alarming given that
many EU notification regimes exempt Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs) from their scope.41
On the other hand, notifying individual users of a breach often generates an overload of information to the user that is of little use. Citing
the ―The Boy who Cried Wolf‖ fable, Schwartz and Janger argue that if
consumers are flooded by frequent cautions with putative harms, it is
likely that they ―will fail to act when important warnings finally arrive.‖42 Supporting such claim is a survey conducted by Ponemon Institute, which found that consumers do not pay sufficient attention to the
notices they receive with over 36% of respondents taking their breach
notification letter as a junk mail whereas 13% of respondents taking
their breach notification email as spam. 43 Therefore, a balance needs to
be struck by compelling organizations to notify only those breaches that
significantly affect the rights of individuals. In this regard, recent legislative initiatives within the EU adopt a risk-based approach where users only need to be notified of those breaches that ‗adversely affect‘ their
rights.44 Another challenge of breach notification requirements is that
the process of conveying information between the businesses and regulatory authorities and between the businesses and individuals opens
another door of security vulnerabilities. For example, consumers are already experiencing phishing attacks via emails informing them of data
breachs.45 Similarly, the regulatory authorities themselves may become
a repository of large amounts of personal data and, thereafter, a target
for attacks.46 The potential for such instances could be found within the
EU legal framework that requires the national authorities to notify individuals if the provider has not already done so or to notify individuals
residing in other Member States.

39. DEKKER ET AL., CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING IN THE EU, supra note 26, at 9.
40. Winn, supra note 10, at 1149.
41. Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, art. 14(8).
42. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 916.
43. PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2012 CONSUMER STUDY ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION,
supra note 32, at 8.
44. Breach notification requirements could employ acquisition-based triggers or
risk-based triggers. See Mark Burdon et al., Encryption safe harbours and data breach
notification laws, 26 COMP. L. & SEC. REV. 520, 523 (2010).
45. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 952.
46. Id. at 963.
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3. BREACH NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE EU
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
3.1. BREACH NOTIFICATION IN THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION SECTOR
The telecom sector is the first of all sectors subject to mandatory
breach notification requirements under the 2002/58 ePrivacy Directive.
Throughout the years, this regime has evolved through a number of
amendments including the 2009 reform on electronic communications
and the Regulation 611/2013. Such a development introduces complexity in compliance with the breach notification requirements. At present,
there are some breaches that require notification under the Framework
Directive.47 Other breaches might have to be made public together with
or separate from the former within the ePrivacy Directive, 48 whereas
notification of breaches specifically effecting personal data have to be
handled according to Regulation 611/2013.49 This implies that different
aspects of the same breach experienced by a telecom service provider
could be subject to different regulatory notification requirements. In
this regard, a study of data breach notifications in the telecom sector
identifies the need for better clarification and guidance at the EU and
local levels in order to ―enable European service providers to comply effectively with [such] requirements.‖50 The following paragraphs highlight the scope of the application and the notification requirement under these different regimes. The discussion of the existing requirements
is motivated by the fact that the emerging requirements are built or extend on the existing breach notification regimes. It also aims to show
the relationship between the rules and the resulting complexity in complying with these rules.
3.1.1. The Framework Directive
The 2002/21 Framework Directive had no clear requirement for
breach notification. However, its amendment, Directive 2009/140/EC
(revised Framework Directive)51 introduces a breach notification obliga47. Directive 2002/21, art. 13a(3), 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33, 55 (EC).
48. Directive 2002/58, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) (ePrivacy Directive).
49. Commission Regulation 611/2013, art. 2-3, of 24 June 2013 on the Measures
Applicable to the Notification of Personal Data Breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on Privacy and Electronic Communications,
2013 O.J. (L 173) 2 (EU).
50. EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS IN THE EU 4
(Jan.
2011),
available
at
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-andtrust/library/deliverables/dbn/at_download/fullReport.
51. Directive 2009/140, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002/19/EC on Access to, and Inter-
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tion under Article 13(a)(3) stating that: ―Member States shall ensure
that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services notify the competent
national regulatory authority of a breach of security or loss of integrity
that has had a significant impact on the operation of networks or services.‖52
Subject Matter of the Framework Directive and the Breach Notification
Requirement
Overall, the objective of the Framework Directive is to establish a
harmonized framework for the regulation of electronic communications
services, electronic communications networks, associated facilities and
services, and certain aspects of terminal equipment to facilitate access
for disabled users. However, the breach notification requirement only
applies to providers of electronic communication network or electronic
communication services that are publicly available.
Electronic communications network – Article 2(a) of the revised
Framework Directive defines electronic communication networks to include transmission systems and switching or routing equipment that
―permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical, or other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and
packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks,
electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals.‖ In addition to the traditional telecommunications networks, such a definition also covers networks for radio and
television broadcasting irrespective of the type of information conveyed
within these networks. The Directive does not cover the physical kit or
any other components that are connected to an electronic communication network or services such as end-user equipment that is used to initiate and receive communications. 53 However, communication networks
should be understood as to include ―both physical and/or logical networks, including switches and other parts that are crucial to the capacity of the networks to convey signals both within the communications
network itself as well as between different communications networks.‖ 54
connection of, Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities,
and 2002/20/EC on the Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37 (EC).
52. Id.
53. TELECOMMUNICATION LAWS IN EUROPE: LAW AND REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 147 (Joachim Scherer ed., 6th ed. Bloomsbury Professional,
2013).
54. BO MARTINSSON ET AL., SWEDISH POST & TEL. AGENCY, WHICH SERVICES AND
NETWORKS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ACT? GUIDANCE 7 (Mar.
11, 2009), available at https://www.pts.se/upload/Rapporter/Internet/2009/services-e-comact-2009-12.pdf.
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This implies that although the breach notification requirement under
Article 13(a)(3) of the revised Framework Directive seems to exclude associated facilities and services, the notification requirements might still
apply if such facilities and services are considered to be ―crucial to the
capacity of the network to convey signals.‖55
Electronic communication services – is defined as a ―service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly, or mainly, in the
conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, including
telecommunication and transmission services in networks used for
broadcasting.‖56 Examples include providers of services of fixed telephony, mobile telephony, fixed Internet access, and mobile Internet access.
The Directive does not cover the content of services delivered over electronic communications networks, such as broadcasting content or financial services. In practice, determining whether a certain service is an
electronic communication services or not has proven to be very difficult.
One of the most controversial issues in such assessment is to what extent and if, for example, Voice over IP (VoIP) providers are covered under the Directive. Another issue of controversy relates to whether the
provision of hardware infrastructure services as in the use of cloud
computing can be deemed as ‗electronic communications service.‘57
The following three criteria are essential to assessing whether a
certain service comprises an electronic communications service. First,
―the service is provided to another (external) party.‖ 58 The use of the
term ―service‖ implies that there are at least two parties involved, i.e.,
one providing the service and another party accessing such service. 59
Second, ―the service is provided…on commercial grounds.‖ 60 The use of
the phrase ―normally provided for remuneration‖ implies that only services provided on a commercial basis are subject to the legislation although this does not exclude remuneration in other forms than direct
payments.61 This means services that are clearly non-profit in nature
including but not limited to research networks are outside the scope of
the Directive. Third, ―the service consists mainly in the conveyance of
signals.‖62 This is deemed to be the case if the service provider ―has con-

55.
56.
57.

Id. at 20.
Directive 2002/21, art. 2(c), 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33, 46 (EC).
BENNO BARNITZKE ET AL., SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME, CLOUD LEGAL
GUIDELINES: DATA SECURITY, OWNERSHIP RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC GREEN LEGISLATION
(PART
II)
25
(Nov.
2011),
available
at
http://www.optimisproject.eu/sites/default/files/content-files/document/optimis-cloud-legal-guidelines-partii.pdf.
58. MARTINSSON ET AL., supra note 54, at 7.
59. Id. at 19-20.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 20.
62. Id. at 17.
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trol (through ownership or agreement) over the signal (the bearer of the
information), and thereby has influence over factors such as transmission and quality.‖63 For example, Internet service providers have control
over the quality of the Internet service. On the contrary, providers of
services such as Skype, which built their services on the Internet service provided by the ISPs, do not have any influence or control over the
conveyance i.e. over the signal (the bearer of the information). 64 This is
because such providers use the end user‘s existing Internet service, and
cannot influence or control the quality of the Internet service.
Publicly available – for the breach notification requirement to apply, the communication networks or services have to be publicly available.65 One major indicator of a service being available to the public is
that there is a ―general opportunity to connect to the service‖ for ―anyone who is willing to both pay for the service and comply with the conditions for its provision.‖66 This means operators of private networks,
such as internal company networks (intranets) as well as services to a
predetermined user groups are excluded from the scope of application.
Examples of services to a predetermined user group include Internet
services provided by cafés and hotels, 67 though the status of such services might differ among the Member States.
What kind of breaches should require notification?
The Directive does not define what a breach of security or loss of integrity under Article 13(a)(3) constitutes. However, Recital 44 sheds
some light, ―System complexity, technical failure or human mistake, accidents or attacks may all have consequences for the functioning and
availability of the physical infrastructures that deliver important services to EU citizens, including e-Government services.‖ From the Recital, the focus of the ―breach of security‖ is on the ―the functioning and
availability of the physical infrastructures.‖ In the areas of networks
and network interconnections ―integrity‖ is also related to ―the ability of
the system to retain its specified attributes in terms of performance and
functionality.‖68 Thus, a breach under Article 13(a)(3) of the revised
63. Id. at 20.
64. However, a general consensus seems to exist in most EU Member States in considering VoIP services with access to telephone number as electronic communications services covered within such regime whereas Peer-Peer VoIP services precluded from the
scope. There are also differences with regard to other services such as e-mails. See
MARTINSSON ET AL., supra note 54.
65. Directive 2009/140, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37 (EC).
66. MARTINSSON ET AL., supra note 54, at 28.
67. Id.
68. DR. MARNIX DEKKER & CHRISTOFFER KARSBURG, EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC.
AGENCY, TECHNICAL GUIDELINE ON INCIDENT REPORTING TECHNICAL GUIDANCE ON THE
INCIDENT
REPORTING
IN
ARTICLE 13A 5 (Oct. 24, 2014), available at
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Framework Directive essentially focuses on breaches that effect the
functionality or continuity of the network or service. In addition, the
provision specifically addresses breaches related to an electronic communication network or service. This implies that data breaches are not
governed under the Framework Directive.
Furthermore, notification only needs to be provided for breaches
with a ―significant impact‖ on the operations of the network or services.
There is no clear definition of what the term ―significant impact‖ constitutes; as noted in the above paragraph, the focus of breaches under Article 13(a)(3) is the functionality or availability of the network or service. This implies that the assessment of a breach‘s significance is
determined by taking into account the length and coverage of the interruption with respect to the functionality or availability of the infrastructure or service. A relevant question to ask would be ―how long is
the functionality or availability of the network or service interrupted?
And, what is the coverage of such interruption, in terms of user-base or
geographical scope?‖
Primarily, the assessment of a significant impact lies in the hands
of the organization. The difficulty is that ―if a firm controls whether disclosure will occur, it has the ability not to‖ disclose such a breach.69
However, the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) are entrusted
with setting the specific criteria for making such decision. In addition,
many Member States provide the possibility for customers or the media
to directly report such breaches to the authorities. 70 This gives a platform for the NRAs to assess whether a breach should have been reported despite an organizations decision not to do so. Although there is no
EU level criteria for assessing ―significant impact,‖ the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has provided some
guidelines regarding the annual summary reporting from the NRAs to
the European Commission (EC) about security incidents that have had
―significant impact.‖ Accordingly, an incident is considered to have a
significant impact if the incident:
(a) Lasts more than an hour, and the percentage of users affected is
more than 15%; or
(b) Lasts more than 2 hours, and the percentage of users affected is
more than 10%; or

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidentsreporting/Technical%20Guidelines%20on%20Incident%20Reporting/technical-guidelineon-incident-reporting/at_download/fullReport.
69. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 931.
70. EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF MEMBER STATES‘ POLICIES
AND
REGULATIONS
POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
76
(2009),
available
at
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/archive/analysis-of-policies-andrecommendations/at_download/fullReport.
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(c) Lasts more than 4 hours, and the percentage of users affected is
more than 5%; or
(d) Lasts more than 6 hours, and the percentage of users affected is
more than 2%; or
(e) Lasts more than 8 hours, and the percentage of users affected is
more than 1%.71

Although the report addresses the notification by NRAs to the EC,
it does provide helpful guidance on the concept of ―significant impact.‖
However, Member States might have different criteria. For example, in
Switzerland, an incident is considered to have significant impact if it
affects 50,000 or more people and lasts for more than five hours whereas in Norway, similar incident affecting 10,000 subscribers or a ―geographical area larger than a municipality‖ has to be reported.72 Once a
security breach that is considered to fulfill the ―significant impact‖ requirement occurs, organizations are required to notify the NRAs. Such
notification is believed to be a very valuable source of information, enabling the authorities to identify problems and develop adequate regulatory measures for outage prevention.73 In some cases, the NRAs might
notify the public of such a breach or might ask the organizations to do
so.74 This is mainly when the authorities believe that such disclosure of
the breach is in the interest of the public. Although the Directive does
not specifically address the circumstances for such disclosure, such decision need to balance the interest of the public against the reputational
harm to the entities. Such notification might be justified, for example,
when the breach would cause significant damage to customers.
The breach notification requirement under the Framework Directive does not involve the notification of individuals. Furthermore, the
Directive does not provide a detailed framework for the breach notification in terms of the timeframe, content and procedure. These aspects of
the breach are addressed by the domestic legislation of the Member
States and there is significant difference among them – ranging from a
few hours after the breach to up to a few days.75 For instance, in Spain
providers are required to provide a preliminary report within the following two hours after the disruption and a thorough report within 10
days.76 Therefore, organizations are required to adhere to such specific
national procedures of notification. E-mail communications or call ser71.
72.

DEKKER & KARSBURG, supra note 69, at 11.
ANALYSIS OF MEMBER STATES‘ POLICIES AND REGULATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 71, at 75.
73. Impact Assessment, supra note 28.
74. Directive 2009/140, art. 13a (3), 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37, 54 (EC).
75. DEKKER ET AL., CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING IN THE EU, supra note 26.
76. ANALYSIS OF MEMBER STATES‘ POLICIES AND REGULATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 70, at 77.
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vices (particularly when the breach is reported by customers or media)
are often preferred channels in many Member States. In most cases, the
content of the notification includes details of the breach, its significance,
and incident mitigation plans and measures. 77
The ePrivacy Directive 2002/58 and its Amending Directive
2009/136/EC
Article 4(2) of the e-Privacy Directive provides that:
In case of a particular risk of a breach of the security of the network,
the provider of a publicly available electronic communications service
must inform the subscribers concerning such risk and, where the risk
lies outside the scope of the measures to be taken by the service provider, of any possible remedies, including an indication of the likely
costs involved.78

Article 4(3) of the amending Directive 2009/136/EC further states
that: ―In the case of a personal data breach, the provider of publicly
available electronic communications services shall, without undue delay, notify the personal data breach to the competent national authority.‖79
Subject matter of the ePrivacy Directive and the breach notification
requirement
The ePrivacy Directive applies to providers of publicly available
―electronic communications services‖ as provided in the Framework Directive and explained in Section 3.1.1. The main point of departure from
the above discussion is that the ePrivacy Directive applies only to actors
which process personal data80 in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communication services.81 This implies that entities providing infrastructures or networks but do not have their own
77. DEKKER ET AL., CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING IN THE EU, supra note 26.
78. Directive 2009/136, art. 4(2), (4), of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users‘
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, 2009 O.J.
(L 337) 1, 22 (EC) [hereinafter Revised ePrivacy Directive].
79. Id.
80. Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (Data Protection Directive). This Directive defines personal data as ―any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (‗data subject‘); an identifiable person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or
to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity[.]‖ Id.
81. Directive 2002/58, art. 3(1), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC).
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customers are not covered under this Directive. Another point of departure is that unlike the Framework Directive where notification is only
required to be made to the national authorities and sometimes to the
public, under the ePrivacy Directive, the providers are obliged to notify
personal data breaches to the competent national authorities, and in
certain cases also to the subscribers and individuals concerned. Furthermore, the ePrivacy Directive covers two different kinds of notifications i.e. the notification of particular risk of breach of network to subscribers as well as the notification of actual personal data breaches to
the national authorities, to the subscribers, and individuals. However,
the relevant security risks here are similar to that of the Framework
Directive and include risks that affect the functionally or availability of
the network or services.
It is important to note the notification of personal data breaches
under the ePrivacy Directive are replaced by the Regulation 611/2013.
This means, commencing from the date where Regulation 611/2013 enters into force,82 only the notification of particular risk network breach
to subscribers is regulated under the ePrivacy Directive. So the breach
notification requirements discussed in this section pertain only to the
notification of risk of breach of network to subscribers. Such an obligation is related with the obligation under Article 4(1), which requires organizations to take the appropriate technical and organizational
measures to safeguard the security of its services taking into account
the risks presented. This implies that the law requires the service providers to identify risks that affect the security of the network proactively and notify the existence of ―particular risks‖ to subscribers. One could
ask whether the subscriber notification is only limited to the ―risk of
breach of network,‖ not to the actual breach of network. In fact, actual
breaches affecting the security of the network would be reported to the
NRAs under the Framework Directive so far as they have a ―significant
impact‖ on the operation of networks or services. Yet, the Framework
Directive does not require notification to subscribers unless the national
authorities notify or cause to notify the public for public interest reasons. So if the network breach does not affect personal data, the provider is not required to notify subscribers of the actual breach under the
ePrivacy Directive. This might be intentional given that the rationale
for notifying the risk of breach of a network is to take measures to mitigate the harms of the risk to the subscriber. A closer look at Article 4(2)
of the Directive shows that the focus of such notification of the risk is to
mitigate, for example the financial impacts of the service interruption
on the subscriber. Once the breach actually happens, the rationale for

82. Although the Regulation was passed on 24 June 2013, it became operative after
two months on 25 August 2013. See Commission Regulation 611/2013, art. 7, 2013 O.J. (L
173) 2, 4 (EU).
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such notification seems to dissipate or at least become insignificant. Entities could still notify the subscriber regarding such breaches. Although
the law is silent on whether all kinds of security risk should be notified,
the term ―particular risks‖ within that article seems to imply certain
level of significance, which will be a matter left to the NRAs to determine.
Overall, providers of electronic communication services that operate their own public communications network are required to notify for
―particular risk‖ of security of network to subscribers under the ePrivacy Directive and actual breaches of networks with ―significant impact‖
on the operations of the network or services to the NRAs according to
the Framework Directive. Whereas providers of electronic communications services that depend on the infrastructure of third parties need to
put in place measures that allow them to comply with such requirements regarding the notification of a ―particular risk.‖ Article 1 of the
ePrivacy Directive emphasizes the need for such service providers to
work in conjunction with the provider of the public communications
network with regards to the identification of such risk affecting network
security and notification thereof. This could often be done through contractual agreements where the infrastructure provider informs the service provider of any security breach or risk. The provision does not mention any timeframe when such notification should be made. However, it
should be noted that such notification is aimed at enabling the subscriber to take appropriate measures to avoid or mitigate the consequences of the risk of the breach. Therefore, one could say that the notification of the risks should be made as soon as possible from the time
the provider becomes aware of the existence of such risk. Regarding the
format and content of notification, Article 4(4) of the ePrivacy Directive
provides that the NRAs may adopt guidelines and, where necessary, issue instructions concerning the circumstances in which providers are
required to notify of a breach and the format and manner in which the
notification is to be made.
Apart from notification of a breach under the ePrivacy Directive,
providers are also required to ―maintain an inventory of personal data
breaches comprising the facts surrounding the breach, its effects and
the remedial action taken‖ in a manner that ―enable the competent national authorities to verify compliance‖ with the notification requirements.83 However, the inventory should only contain ―information necessary for this purpose[,]‖84 meaning that it should not, to the extent
possible, contain any personal data in order to avoid another potential
source of vulnerabilities. Compliance with such obligation could be relevant during enforcement actions by the NRAs and in determining the
83.
84.

Directive 2009/136, art. 4(4) ¶ 2, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 1, 22 (EC).
Id.
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size of monetary penalties to be imposed.
Regulation 611/2013
Subject Matter of the Regulation 611/2013 and the Breach Notification
Requirement
As briefly noted above, this Regulation covers the notification of
personal data breaches previously regulated under the ePrivacy Directive. The Commission recognizes that the different implementation
of the breach notification requirements within the ePrivacy Directive
creates significant legal uncertainty, along with more complex and considerable ―administrative costs for providers operating cross-border.‖85
Therefore, the adoption of the Regulation 611/2013 aims at harmonizing
such requirements.86
The application of the Regulation is limited to the notification of
personal data breaches by providers of publicly available electronic
communications services as discussed in Section 3.1.1.87 This means notifications regarding ―particular risk‖ of a breach of the security of the
network to subscribers are still dealt under the ePrivacy Directive and
the national implementations.88
Personal data breach – is defined as ―…a breach of security leading
to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized
disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed in connection with the provision of a publicly available
electronic communications service in the Union.‖ 89 Having an EU level
definition of personal data breach is expected to harmonize breach notification requirements across the community although differences still
exists based on the definition of what constitutes personal data. Meanwhile, when the proposed GDPR hits the statute shelf, it is expected to
contribute to addressing such differences, as it will apply uniformly
85. Id.
86. Commission Regulation 611/2013, rec. 4, 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 2 (EU). In the European legal framework a Directive has to be transposed into national law for its application whereas a Regulation becomes binding on Member States without the need to transpose it into national law. Although the harmonization introduced by the Regulation is a
move in the right direction, providers of electronic communication services experiencing a
network breach that affects personal data have to deal with the national implementations
of Member States in reporting breaches under the Framework Directive and are required
to comply with the rules under the Regulation 611/2013. Furthermore, such providers are
under obligation to notify their subscribers‘ risks of security of the network under the
ePrivacy Directive. Given the disparities in the national implementation of Article 4 of the
ePrivacy Directive, compliance will likely create significant challenge for organizations.
Id.
87. Id. art. 1, at 2.
88. Id. art. 2(5), at 5.
89. Id. at 2.
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across all Member States.
The Regulation 611/2013 applies only to breaches that affect the
―personal data‖ of individuals. Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive defines personal data as ―any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.‖ 90 Identification involves ―describe[ing] a person in such a way that he or she is distinguishable from
all other persons and recognizable [sic] as an individual.‖91 Such identification of the individual could happen directly from the information being processed such as the full name of the person or indirectly from information related to the physical, economic, or social identity of that
particular individual. However, for the Directive to be applicable it is
not required that the person be identified, meaning that a mere possibility to associate certain information to a particular individual is sufficient. Unlike the Directive, the proposed GDPR broadens the definition
of ―personal data‖ to cover device identifiers, IP addresses and location
data.92
Notification to National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs)
Article 2(2) of the Regulation provides that the provider ―shall notify the personal data breach to the competent national authority no later
than 24 hours after the detection of the personal data breach, where
feasible.‖93
Unlike the other breach notification rules that require certain degree of significance, the requirement under the Regulation is applicable
to any breach regardless of its significance. Therefore, all personal data
breaches should be brought to the attention of the relevant authorities
within 24 hours of detection. A breach is deemed to be detected ―when
the provider has acquired ‗sufficient awareness’ that a security incident
has occurred that led to personal data being compromised, in order to
make a meaningful notification as required under this Regulation.‖94
The question is: when is the provider‘s awareness deemed to be ―sufficient.‖ According to Recital 8 of the Regulation, neither a simple suspicion nor a simple detection of an incident is sufficient. Of particular relevance in such assessment is the availability of the information referred
to in Annex I, which lists the content of the information to be provid-

90. EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN
DATA
PROTECTION
LAW
36
(Apr.
2014),
available
at
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nded_en.pdf.
91. Id. at 39.
92. See GDPR, supra note 8, ¶24, at 21.
93. Commission Regulation 611/2013, art. 2(2), 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 4 (EU).
94. Id. art. 2(2) ¶3, at 4.
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ed.95 Thus, if the organization is in a position to explain the breach well
enough in terms of the kind of the breach (whether it is loss or
theft/copying of personal data), the time the breach occurred, and the
type of data affected, it could be considered as sufficient. Furthermore,
the technical and organizational measures in place to detect a breach
play a significant role in assessing the sufficiency of the awareness. The
less compliant an organization is with its data security obligations, the
less likely such phrase would be interpreted in its favor against delay.
In other words, if an organization fails to take appropriate security
measures such as keeping access logs to detect unauthorized access, it
will not be able to justify its delay for lack of ―sufficient awareness‖ in
detecting the breach (unauthorized access).
Timeframe for notification – In principle the notification should be
made within 24 hours, where feasible. Although the inclusion of the
term ―where feasible‖ offers a space for flexibility, it could lead to a situation where different national competent authority could define the
term differently making 24 hour disclosure infeasible. However, such
term should be interpreted in light of the three phases of notification
recognized under the Regulation. First, an initial notification should be
made within 24 hours. During the initial phase, the provider ―determines whether the detected event is indeed a personal data breach,‖ the
circumstances of the breach and its estimated severity and reports it to
the national authorities within 24 hours.96 This is followed by a detailed
notification in a standardized format as soon as possible and at least
within three days of the initial notification. This will provide further details of the breach including measures taken to mitigate the breach. 97
However, if, despite all the necessary efforts, the provider is unable to
provide all information within the three-day period, it has to do so at a
later time accompanied by a ―reasoned justification for the late notification of the remaining information.‖98
Among other things, the notification to the competent authorities
should contain the name of the provider, a contact point within the organization, circumstances of the personal data breach, date and time of
detection of the incident, ―nature and content of the personal data concerned‖ and ―the technical and organizational measures taken by the
provider‖ to correct the breach.99 Providers could use a variety of communication channels to notify the competent authority, including
95.
96.

Id. Annex I, at 7.
EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS ON TECHNICAL
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES OF ARTICLE 4, at 22 (Barbara Daskala & Slawomir Gorniak
eds., Apr. 2012), available at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-andtrust/risks-and-data-breaches/dbn/art4_tech/at_download/fullReport.
97. Commission Regulation 611/2013, Annex 1 §2, 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 7 (EU).
98. Id. art. 2(3) ¶2, at 4.
99. Id. Annex I §2, at 7.
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emails and phone calls. One essential aspect of breach notifications requirements is the principle of ―dissociation‖ where the communication
of the breach should contain information regarding the breach as its
core and only content.100 For example, if providers are required to notify
the authorities regarding processing of personal data, the notification of
breaches should not be communicated in the same e-mail.
Notification to subscribers or individuals
Article 3(1) provides that ―when the personal data breach is likely
to adversely affect the personal data or privacy of a subscriber or individual, the provider shall, in addition to the notification referred to in
Article 2, also notify the subscriber or individual of the breach.‖ 101
An important aspect of Regulation 611/2013 is that it covers
breaches affecting not only natural persons but also legal persons. In
this regard, it is important to distinguish between the ―subscriber‖ and
―individual‖ user. Such distinction is important because the subscriber,
which can be either a legal person or natural person, may not always be
the same person as the user. For example, parents can have a subscription to value added services such as locating the mobile phone of their
children in which case the parents are the subscribers and their children are the individual users. Article 3(1) of the Regulation requires
that both the subscriber and the individual user be notified when personal data breach is likely to affect the privacy of the subscriber or the
individual. Nonetheless, in some cases, such notification to the individual could prove to be difficult because the provider might lack a direct
contract or contact information. If the subscriber is only a legal person
such as a company, it is less likely that the breach would constitute
personal data breach.
Providers are required to notify affected individual or subscribers
when the breach ―is likely to adversely affect‖ their personal data or
their privacy rights. As noted above, this aims at balancing the interest
of the business in terms of ―fatigue of notifications‖ and the privacy
rights of the individuals. Article 3(2) of the Regulation lists three factors that should be used to determine whether a breach is ―likely to adversely affect‖ the subscriber or privacy rights of the individuals. These
are: (a) the nature and content of data concerned; (b) the likely consequences of the personal data breach for the subscriber or individual
concerned; and (c) the circumstances of the personal data breach. 102
Breaches affecting certain categories of personal data are considered to fulfill such requirement. Examples are breaches affecting finan-

100. Id. at 3.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. art. 3(2), at 5.
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cial information such as credit card data, special categories of data, 103
―e-mail data, location data, internet log files, web browsing histories
and itemized [sic] call lists‖.104 This is because such breaches might result in ―identity theft[,] fraud, physical harm,…[significant] humiliation
or damage to reputation.‖105 This implies that the assessment is not limited only to ―breaches that result in economic loss, but also breaches
that may cause immaterial damages, such as any moral and reputational damages.‖106 The Article 29 Working Party (Working Party), a
group composed of national Data Protection Authorities, underlines the
need to consider secondary effects of the breaches such as the time
spent in attempts to rectify the breach and the extent of distress suffered.107 In addition, the reference to the term ―likely‖ implies that the
mere likelihood that the breach will adversely affect the individual is
sufficient, meaning that an actual adverse effect is not necessary.
Based on the three factors under Article 3(2), ENISA has developed
the following, albeit complex, methodology for assessing the severity of
breaches on the privacy rights of individuals. 108
SE= DPC x EI + CB

SE stands for severity of the breach.109 DCP stands for Data Processing Context, which ―addresses the type of the breached data, together with a number of factors linked to the overall context of processing.‖110 A score of 1-4 is assigned to the following four categories of
data in their order: simple, behavioral, financial, and sensitive. EI
stands for Ease of Identification, which addresses ―how easily the identity of the individuals can be deduced from the data involved in the
breach.‖111 Four levels of EI are identified (negligible, limited, significant and maximum) with a linear increase in score ranging from 0.25–1

103. Council Directive 95/46, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). This Directive defines
special categories of personal data as any information ―revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life‖ and data relating to offences, criminal convictions or security measures, or to administrative sanctions or judgments in civil cases.
Id.
104. Commission Regulation 611/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 3 (EU).
105. Id. art. 3(2)(b), at 5.
106. EUR. CONSUMER ORG., supra note 38, at 4.
107. Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2014 on Personal Data Breach
Notification
(Mar.
25,
2014),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp213_en.pdf.
108. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A METHODOLOGY OF THE ASSESSMENT OF SEVERITY OF
PERSONAL DATA BREACHES, supra note 29, at 3.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id.
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including 0.5, and 0.75.112 CB stands for Circumstances of Breach,
which ―addresses the specific circumstances of the breach including the
type of the breach… [and] any involved malicious intent.‖ 113 Depending
on the particular situation, CB could be assigned values of 0, 0.25 or
0.5. Ultimately, the SE result belongs to a certain range of values,
which corresponds to one of the four severity levels: low (SE score of
<2),114 medium (2 ≤ SE < 3),115 high (3 ≤ SE< 4)116 and very high (4 ≤
SE).117 Clearly, the use of the above method will not be an easy exercise.
However, it might be relevant for organizations, which already use
quantitative scales in measuring the likelihoods and consequences of
information security breaches. This methodology implicitly strengthens
the proposal discussed in Section 4 for the integration of breach notification requirements into overall risk management framework and the
security risk analysis in particular. Organizations who manage to address breach notification requirements in conjunction with security risk
analysis would find it easier to use this methodology than others. The
method above could also be used by national authorities in assessing
whether the provider has to notify the individuals involved.
Overall, a cautious approach is recommended by the Working Party
in assessing the adverse impact. More particularly, the Working Party
recommends that ―where there is doubt…regarding… the likelihood of
adverse effects… [organizations] should err on the side of caution and
proceed with notification.‖118 The question that follows is who must
make the assessment of the adverse effects on the individual —the authorities or the provider. Primarily, it is the organizations‘ discretion to
determine whether certain breach is likely to have an adverse effect on
the privacy rights of the individuals. This sounds logical given the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the breach are in possession
112.
113.

Id. at 18.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A METHODOLOGY OF THE ASSESSMENT OF SEVERITY OF
PERSONAL DATA BREACHES, supra note 29, at 3.
114. Id. at 6. A low SE score means ―individuals either will not be affected or may
encounter a few inconveniences, which they will overcome without any problem (time
spent re-entering information, annoyances, irritations, etc.).‖ Id.
115. Id. A medium SE score means ―individuals may encounter significant inconveniences, which they will be able to overcome despite a few difficulties (extra costs, denial of
access to business services, fear, lack of understanding, stress, minor physical ailments,
etc.).‖ Id.
116. Id. A high SE score means ―individuals may encounter significant consequences,
which they should be able to overcome albeit with serious difficulties (misappropriation of
funds, blacklisting by banks, property damage, loss of employment, subpoena, worsening
of health, etc.)‖ Id.
117. Id. A very high SE score means ―individuals may encounter significant, or even
irreversible, consequences, which they may not overcome (financial distress such as substantial debt or inability to work, long-term psychological or physical ailments, death,
etc.)‖ Id.
118. Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 107.
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of the organization. However, a company that suffers a data security
breach may be hesitant to disclose information about this event and individuals might not get the chance to take remedial measures. To remedy this problem, there are suggestions for anonymous ways of reporting certain kinds of breaches in order to help individuals mitigate the
resulting harms.119
Another question is whether the notification to individuals is limited to those affected or to all the customers of the organization. To the
extent that such notices are intended to motivate individuals to take
steps to mitigate the harms, one could argue that the notification
should mainly target individuals affected. However, if there is a lingering risk for other customers, the organization should notify all of such
risk. In fact, organizations might be required to notify customers of
such risk under the ePrivacy Directive although it only mentions subscribers without mentioning individuals, meaning that under the ePrivacy Directive individuals will only be notified in their status as subscribers. In addition, the reference within Article 3(1) to ―a subscriber or
individual‖ makes it clear that notification should be provided when a
data breach adversely affects even a single person‘s privacy.120
Exemption – Individuals do not need to be notified in some circumstances, specifically, when providers manage to demonstrate that the
data affected by the breach was rendered unintelligible.121 According to
Article 4(2) of the Regulation, a data is considered to be unintelligible
where: ―(a) it has been securely encrypted with a standardized algorithm‖ or ―replaced by its hashed value calculated with a standardized
cryptographic keyed hash function;‖ (b) ―the key used to decrypt or to
hash the data has not been compromised in any security breach;‖ and
(c) it has been demonstrated that the key used to decrypt or hash the
data ―cannot be ascertained by available technological means by any
person who is not authorized to access the key.‖122 The main rationale
behind such exception is that if a data was made initially unintelligible,
the residual privacy risks of the breach are considered to be minimal –
not likely ―to adversely affect‖ the personal data or privacy rights of individuals.123 Meanwhile, the exception relating to technological protection measures is not an automatic safe harbor and needs to be approved
by the competent authority. There are three approaches to providing
safe harbor to such obligation: an exemption, a rebuttable presumption,
and factor-based analysis.124 The EU legislator seems to prefer the fac119. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9.
120. Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 107.
121. Commission Regulation 611/2013, art. 4(1), 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 5 (EU).
122. Id. art. 4(2)(a), at 5.
123. Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 107 at 1.
124. Exemptions provide a general safe harbour for notification if personal data has
been acquired in unintelligible form. Rebuttable presumptions create a presumption that
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tor-based analysis where the implementation of such measures is one
factor in demonstrating to the regulatory authorities that the rights of
the data subject are not affected.
In addition, organizations have to still notify the NRAs regardless
of such measures. In some cases, the organizations might even be required to notify individuals of the breach even if the data is sufficiently
encrypted. This is because, for example, in the absence of adequate
backups, a loss or alteration of encrypted data can still negatively affect
data subjects.125 This is important because encryptions cannot prevent
loss of data. Thus, for the purposes of the exemptions from notification,
it is important to make a distinction among the three kinds of personal
data breaches: ―availability breach‖ —which refers to the ―accidental or
unlawful destruction of data[;]‖ ―integrity breach‖—which refers to ―alteration of personal data,‖ and ―confidentiality breach‖ that relates to
―unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data.‖126 This implies
that the exception regarding unintelligible data does not prevent
―availability breach‖ and might not exempt the entity from notifying the
individual. Although one could argue that breaches affecting availability might not in the strict legal sense affect the privacy rights of individuals, Article 3(1) of the Regulation refers to ―personal data or privacy
of a subscriber or individual.‖127 This implies that breaches affecting
availability might still adversely affect the personal data of subscribers
or individuals.
Timeframe for notification – According to Article 3(3), ―the notification to the subscriber or individual shall be made without undue delay
after the detection of the personal data breach.‖ 128 Furthermore, the
―[n]otification… shall not be dependent on the notification to…national
authorities.‖129 This implies, for example that an organization should
not try to prioritize notification to the authorities over subscribers or
individuals. Given the aim of such notification is to avoid or mitigate
the consequences of the breach; the notification should be given immediately or in such time as to enable the subscriber or individual to mitigate the adverse effects of the breach. In light of such rationale, it is argued that the term without undue delay involves a shorter interval than
the notification to the authority, which is within 24 hours after detecno risk exists if unintelligible data is acquired which can be rebutted if evidence is found
to the contrary. In factor-based analysis, unintelligibility is merely a factor accounted for
in determining whether harm will reasonably result from the breach. See Burdon et al.,
supra note 43, at 528-530.
125. Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 107, at 1.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Commission Regulation 611/2013, art. 3(1), 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 5 (EU). Emphasis added.
128. Id. art. 3(3), at 5.
129. Id.
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tion of the breach.130 However, there is a potential for deviating from
the ―undue delay‖ requirement. Such circumstances, for example, include ―where the notification to the subscriber or individual may put at
risk the proper investigation of the personal data breach.‖ 131 It seems
that investigations related to other crimes other than the personal data
breach itself might also justify the delay. In all other cases, such assessment has to be made on case-by-case basis by the competent national authorities.132
Content – The Regulation, under Article 3(4), requires the notification to subscribers or individuals to describe at least the name of the
provider, the contact points within the provider where more information
can be obtained, description of the causes, timing and the circumstances
of the breach, nature and content of the personal data breached and the
likely consequences to the subscriber or individual, and measures taken
by the provider to address the breach and recommended measures to
mitigate the adverse effects.133 The challenge with information provision rules such as this has always been to strike the balance between
the information provided and the usability of the information by the recipient. A study shows that 61% of consumers have problems understanding the notification and 72% claiming that the ―notification did not
increase their understanding about the data breach.‖134 Therefore, Article 3(4) emphasizes the importance of providing clear and easily understandable information outlining the risks and recommended actions
without technical terms. Providing clear contact point for the competent
authority, of the provider as well as of consumer organizations would
also be important. Understandability of the notification would also imply ―that individuals whose data has been breached receive the notification in their own language.‖135 However, the challenge remains for operators that trade cross-border. For example, an operator providing
services across the EU that sustains a personal data breach might need
to issue the notification letter with more than 20 different languages.
There might also be language issues when the breach affects users residing in a Member State where more than one language is spoken.
Furthermore, in order to avoid confusion, the notification should not be
allowed to contain advertisements or offers for other services, such as
identity theft insurance.136
130. Barcelo & Traung, supra note 122, at 96.
131. Commission Regulation 611/2013, art. 3(5) 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 3 (EU).
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. art. 3(4), Annex II, at 5, 8.
134. PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2012 CONSUMER STUDY ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION,
supra note 3, at 4, 5, 10.
135. EUR. CONSUMER ORG., supra note 16, at 11.
136. Commission Regulation 611/2013, art. 3(4) & Annex II, 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 5, 8
(EU).
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Means of notification – In principle, the provider can choose any
communication means taking into account the state of the art that ensures a prompt receipt of the notification. 137 This will also depend on
the contact information in the possession of the company. Therefore,
post addresses as well as email communications could be used to inform
the individuals or subscribers. However, research shows that consumers
do not pay sufficient attention to the notices they receive. 138 Similarly,
49% of respondents to a survey thought that their breach notice was either junk mail (36%) or spam (13%). 139 Therefore, organizations should
endeavor to get the full attention of the individual users, for example by
using a clearly headed letter of notification and consider a combination
of different notification channels. In cases where the provider does not
have the contact details of the affected individuals, the provider should
take reasonable steps to ensure that all affected individuals are made
aware of the breach. Such efforts might include ―requesting support
from other providers or controllers in possession of the contact details.‖140 If, having made reasonable efforts, the provider is unable to
identify the individuals within the notification timeframe notification
may be made through advertisements in national or regional newspapers. However, such notification via mass media does not seem to be
mandatory although such discretion seems to be applicable only where
there is no direct contractual relationship between the provider and the
end user.141 What is unclear is the extent of such discretion, if at all,
where there is direct contractual relationship between the provider and
the end user but the provider claims not having the contact details of
the individual. However, given that contact details are part of most contractual relationships in providing a service, such situation is less likely
to occur.
3.2. BREACH NOTIFICATION BY ‗DATA CONTROLLERS‘ OR ‗DATA
PROCESSORS‘: DRAFT GDPR
Subject matter of the draft GDPR and the breach notification
requirement
There have been calls for the introduction of breach notification requirements beyond the telecom sector.142 This is because breaches oc137. Id. art. 3(6), at 5.
138. PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2012 CONSUMER STUDY ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION,
supra note 32, at 1.
139. PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2012 CONSUMER STUDY ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION,
supra note 32, at 8.
140. Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 107, at 13.
141. Commission Regulation 611/2013, art. 3(7), 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 5 (EU).
142. EUR. CONSUMER ORG., supra note 16, at 3.

2014]

E.U. BREACH NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

345

curring in the hands of non-telecom actors might be as harmful for consumers as the breaches sustained by telecom providers.143 The proposed
GDPR seems to heed to such quest and extends the personal data
breach notifications beyond the electronic communications sector to
controllers and, to certain extent, processors. Given that the adoption of
EU legislation requires an agreement between the European Parliament and the European Council on the proposal placed by the Commission,144 at present there are three different drafts of the Regulation that
reflect the position of these organs i.e., the initial Commission draft,145
the draft from the European Parliament‘s Committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs (hereinafter the LIBE draft)146 and a preliminary draft from the European Council (hereinafter the Council draft).147
The main differences with respect to the breach notification in these
drafts will be highlighted when relevant. Any reference to the proposed
Regulation is to the initial Commission draft.
It is important to note that the breach notification requirement under Regulation 611/2013 is essentially similar to the proposed GDPR.
This is not incidental. It originates from the legislator‘s intent of harmonizing notification requirements regarding personal data across sectors.148 Thus, the discussions regarding the types of breaches covered,
when a breach is considered to occur, the content and procedures of notification under Section 3.1.3 are more or less relevant to this section.
Another reason to focus on the Regulation 611/2013 is because it is currently in force whereas the GDPR is in state of fluidity. This section only focuses on the salient features of the proposed Regulation. The first
point of departure in the proposed Regulation is that it applies to ―data
controller‖ and ―data processor.‖
Data controller – is defined as ―…the natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others
determines the purposes, conditions and means of the processing of personal data‖.149 For an actor to be considered as a controller, the follow143. Id.
144. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 289(1), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 172 (EU).
145. GDPR, supra note 8.
146. LIBE Draft, supra note 8.
147. Council of the Eur. Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data (Dec. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Council
Draft],
available
at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2017
831%202013%20INIT.
148. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 611/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 173) 2, 3 (EU) (referring that the Regulation is fully consistent with the proposed measure under the draft
Data Protection Regulation).
149. GDPR, supra note 8, art. 4(5), at 41.
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ing requirements are essential. First, a controller can be a natural or
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body. This implies
that the form or nature of the entity is irrelevant. Second, the controller
determines the purposes, conditions and means of the processing. This
is a crucial element and one of the main factors in assessing this aspect
is the level of influence and of the details that someone have in determining ―why‖ (i.e. purposes) and ―how‖ (i.e. means) certain processing
activities should be performed. In establishing controllership, it has to
be noted that the factual circumstance is a more relevant factor than a
―fine tune‖ designation based on contract or law. 150 This means, for example, a clear contractual provision designating a party not as a controller is not relevant if all the other circumstances indicate otherwise.
Third, the decision regarding the ―purpose and means‖ can be made
jointly with others – where several legally separate entities who together or jointly with others process data for a shared purpose.
Data processor – is defined as ―any natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on
behalf of the controller.‖151 To act as a processor a natural being or an
entity must fulfill the following two elements. First, it must be a legally
separate subject or legal entity with respect to the controller. Second, it
must process personal data on behalf of the controller. This implies that
decisions on the ―purpose‖ and ―essential means‖ should be made by the
controller.152 The concept of ―essential means‖ gives a ―margin of maneuver‖ for processors such as cloud providers, to determine technical
and organizational questions without being considered ―controllers‖.
Thus, often cloud providers are considered data processors so far as the
provider adheres to the controllers instructions and does not process the
data for its own purposes, for example for advertising. 153
Territorial scope of the draft Regulation
Not all controllers and processors of personal data are required to
comply with the breach notification requirements. The Regulation provides three legal grounds for its application: 154
(A) Processing of personal data occurs in the context of the activities of the controller or processor established within the EU. 155 This
means that for the Regulation to apply two conditions must be fulfilled.
These are: (a) the controller or processor has to have an establishment
in one of the EU Member States, and (b) the processing should occur in
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 107, at 8.
GDPR, supra note 8, art. 4(6), at 42.
Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 107, at 15.
Id.
GDPR, supra note 8, art. 3 at 41.
Id. art. 3(1), at 41.
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the context of the activities of the controller or processor in that Member States. Hence, the mere fact a controller or processor has an establishment in Member State is not sufficient to apply the Regulation. Rather the processing has to relate to the activities of the controller or
processor in such Member State.156
(B) Processing of personal data of EU residents by a controller or
processor established outside the EU where the processing activities are
related to the offering of goods or services.157 Essentially, this requirement applies when a non-EU trader collects personal data through selling goods or services to EU residents. However, it is not necessary that
an actual sale of goods or services occurs in order for the Regulation to
apply. It is sufficient that the trader is processing personal data while
envisaging the offering of goods or services to data subjects residing in
one or more Member States in the Union.158 For example, if a consumer
residing in the EU contacts a trader established outside the EEA and
thereby the trader becomes in possession of the contact details of the
consumer, the trader might have to comply with the Regulation even if
the consumer did not purchase the goods or services provided the traded has envisaged offering goods or services in one or more Member
States in the Union.
(C) Processing of personal data of EU residents by a controller or
processor established outside the EU where the processing activities are
related to the ―monitoring of the behavior of data subjects.‖ 159 This requirement applies regardless of the commercial nature of the activity so
far as the controller monitors the behavior of a data subject residing in
the EU for example by storing activity logs of website users through the
use of cookies.
It is not the aim of this article to go into a detailed discussion regarding the scope of the Regulation, which is one of the controversial
areas of the draft Regulation. But it has to be noted that this provision
is broad enough to bring all providers of Internet services including but
156. The recent Google decision from the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) further elaborates the concept of ‗context of activities of an establishment in a
Member State‘. The CJEU highlights that ―In the light of that objective of Directive 95/46
and of the wording of Article 4(1)(a), it must be held that the processing of personal data
for the purposes of the service of a search engine such as Google Search, which is operated
by an undertaking that has its seat in a third State but has an establishment in a Member State, is carried out ‗in the context of the activities‘ of that establishment if the latter
is intended to promote and sell, in that Member State, advertising space offered by the
search engine which serves to make the service offered by that engine profitable.‖ See
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
2014 E.C.R., ¶55, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-131/12 (not yet
published in reporter).
157. GDPR, supra note 8, art. 3(2(a)) at 41.
158. GDPR, supra note 8, at 20.
159. GDPR, supra note 8, art. 3(2(b)) at 41.
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not limited to websites, social networks, and app providers under the
scope of the Regulation even at the slightest interaction with data subjects residing in the Union. Furthermore, the Regulation is primarily
concerned with the processing of personal data ―wholly or partly by automatic means.‖160 The use of the term ―wholly or partly‖ implies that
an automated operation that involves some manual use of personal data
is within the realm of the Regulation. In addition, the draft Regulation
is also applicable to non-automated processing which forms part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system such as specially structured paper file.161 Essentially, the draft Regulation applies
whenever personal data is processed, either automatically or not, barring certain exceptions.162
Notification by data controllers to Data Protection Authorities (DPAs)
This part highlights the main differences in the notification of personal data breaches to the relevant authorities in comparison with the
discussion of Regulation 611/2013.
First, although the initial Commission and the Council draft were
similar to the definition of ―personal data breach‖ as in the 611/2013
Regulation, the LIBE draft leaves out the term ―security breach leading…‖163 This seems to be an attempt to focus on the personal data
breach as an outcome by itself than ―as an end result of security
breaches.‖164 This implies that for the Regulation to apply the personal
data breach does not necessarily need to be a result of a security breach.
One such instance could be misuse of access rights by authorized people
such as employees where such misuse results in unauthorized disclosure of the data concerned.165 Nonetheless, one could also put a similar
argument regarding the Regulation 611/2013.
Second, the initial Commission draft and the Regulation 611/2013
require the notification of any personal data breaches, regardless of its
160. GDPR, supra note 8, art. 2(1), at 40.
161. GDPR, supra note 8, art. 4(4), at 41. Article 4(4) defines ‗filing system‘ as any
structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether
centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis. Id.
162. GDPR, supra note 8, art. 3(2), at 41. These include: (1) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, for example, processing operations
concerning public security, defence, State security and the activities of the State in areas
of criminal law; (2) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household
activity. Id.
163. LIBE Draft, supra note 8, at art. 4(9).
164. W. Kuan Hon et al., Cloud Accountability: The Likely Impact of the Proposed EU
Data Protection Regulation 37 (Tilburg Law Sch., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 7,
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2405971_code599.pdf?abstractid=24
05971&mirid=1.
165. Id.
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impact, to the competent authorities. However, the amendment from
the Council limits the breaches to be notified to the DPAs only to data
breaches that are likely to ―severely‖ affect rights and freedoms of data
subjects. In addition, the Council introduces an exception in notifying
the authorities when notification to individuals is not required because
of technological measures.166 Some scholars argue that the ―notification
of personal data breaches to the DPAs may not be necessary when the
rights and freedoms of data subjects are not likely to be affected.‖ 167
However, the rationale behind the notification to the DPAs goes beyond
the protection of rights and freedoms of individuals. On the one hand,
such notification enables the authorities to identify patterns of breaches
and learn where policy interventions and cooperation might be required. On the other hand, the notification to the authorities enables
them to assess whether notification to individuals should take place.
This ensures that the assessment of whether the rights of the data subjects are likely to be affected does not solely rest in the hands of the entities.168 Moreover, such requirement would introduce unjustified discrimination between entities processing personal data in the electronic
communications sector that have to notify any breaches to the authorities under the Regulation 611/2013 and others that have to notify only
for data breaches that are likely to ―severely‖ affect rights and freedoms
of data subjects.
Third, unlike the initial draft from the Commission that would require notification to the DPAs ―without undue delay and, where feasible, within 24 hours‖ after the controller becomes aware of the breach,
the draft from LIBE requires notification without ―undue delay‖ leaving
out any reference to specific timeframe while the draft from the Council
extends the time to 72 hours, where feasible.169 Such changes have to do
with the lobby following the release of the initial draft. In light of the
short timeframes for notification, the fines were considered by many entities as too high and burdensome.170 However, the proposed change in
the LIBE‘s draft from the 24-hour time limit to ―without undue delay‖
omitting any reference to a specific timeframe could lead to inconsistent
approaches among different Member States. This is particularly true
given that Article 21(1) of the proposed Regulation gives Member States
the power to restrict through legislative measures certain rights and ob166. Council Draft, supra note 147, art. 31(1a), at 131.
167. Hon et al., supra note 164.
168. However, to facilitate this ex-post verification, the communication to the authorities ought to contain an explanation for not notifying the individuals.
169. LIBE Draft, supra note 8, art. 31(1), at 108; see also Council Draft, supra note
147, art. 31(1), at 127.
170. Luke Danagher, An Assessment of the Draft Data Protection Regulation: Does it
Effectively Protect Data? 3 EUR. J.L. & TECH., no. 3, 2012, available at
http://ejlt.org/article/view/171/260.
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ligations laid down under specific provisions of the Regulation. And, Article 32, which lays down the breach notification obligation, is one provision, which could be subject to such restrictions. Although the scope of
the power of the Member States would nevertheless need to meet certain conditions listed under Article 21(2), given the wider list of the
conditions, different implementations of this provision is not unlikely.
This might defeat the main rationale for of the Regulation itself, which
is to bring uniformly applicable rules throughout the Community.
Therefore, if the wording of the LIBE draft is something to go by, works
are required from the Commission in avoiding different approach to
what ―without undue delay‖ means. However, this should not be taken
to imply an extended period of notification. As we have seen above, the
rationale behind the notification for individuals dictates that the term
―without undue delay‖ should be understood as entailing notification of
breaches immediately when the data controller has the information regarding the breach.
Furthermore, unlike the Regulation 611/2013, the draft GDPR does
not include different phases of notification. The initial Commission
draft allows organizations to notify the Regulatory authorities later
than 24 hours upon reasoned justification. The LIBE draft completely
avoids any reference to such issue whereas the Council draft allows reasoned justification after the 72 hours limit. The different phases of notification in the Regulation 611/2013 enable organization to notify regulators even though they do not have all the necessary information about
the breach. However, the approach in the draft GDPR might discourage
organizations from notifying unless they have all the necessary information, which might in turn endanger the privacy rights of individuals.
In addition, Art 31(4a) of the LIBE draft introduces an obligation on
DPAs to maintain a public register of the ―types‖ of breaches. The main
objective of such obligation is to enable the authorities verify compliance and use the data for further policy development purposes. The register can also be used to educate the public about the types and
amounts of data breaches and ―if the register identifies the controllers
involved‖ it imposes a reputational cost through ―naming and shaming.‖171
Obligation on ‗processors‘ to alert controllers
According to Article 31(2) processors are required to inform and
alert the controller of any personal data breach. The initial Commission
draft requires this to happen ―immediately‖ after the establishment of a
personal data breach whereas the LIBE and the Council draft uses the
term ―without undue delay.‖ The importance in such a change in tech-

171.

Hon et al., supra note 164, at 38.
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nology is not clear but given that both the Parliament and the Council
are pushing to relax the timeframe for notification, ―undue delay‖ seems
to provide more leverage for processors than the term ―immediately‖.
Notification to Individuals
Discussions in Section 3.1.3 regarding the notification of personal
data breaches to individuals or subscribers are generally relevant for
this Section. This part highlights the main differences in comparison to
the discussions in Section 3.1.3.
First, the initial Commission draft requires notification of the individual data subjects when the breach is ―likely to adversely affect the
protection of the personal data or privacy of the data subject,‖172 which
is similar to the wording under the Regulation 611/2013. Nevertheless,
the LIBE draft uses the term ―when the breach is likely to adversely affect the protection of the personal data, the privacy, the rights or the legitimate interests of the data subject‖.173 This further broadens the scope
of the assessment beyond the privacy right of the individual and employs a very broad and unclear terminology of ―legitimate interest.‖ This
gives a broader discretion to include other impacts on the individual
within the assessment. For example, the inclusion of the time spent in
attempts to rectify the breach and the extent of distress suffered would
be more plausible within such terminology. On the other hand, the
Council draft requires notification to the data subject ―when the personal data breach is likely to severely affect the rights and freedoms of
the data subject.‖174 The Council draft does not also limit the effect of
the personal data breach to the privacy rights of the individual but it
employs a rather restrictive term ―severely‖ as opposed to ―adversely‖.175
Second, another deviation could also emerge with regard to the notification of individuals. Article 8 of the draft Regulation specifically
dealing with child data is a new feature in the reform. Generally, a
child is defined, under the initial Commission draft and the LIBE draft,
―as any person below the age of 18 years.‖176 The Council draft does not
172. GDPR, supra note 8, art. 32(1), at 61.
173. LIBE Draft, supra note 8, art. 32(1), at 110.
174. Council Draft, supra note 147, art. 32(1), at 130.
175. The Oxford online dictionary defines ―adversely‖ as ―unfavorably, harmfully‖
whereas ―severely‖ as ―in a manner, or to a degree, that is distressing or hard to bear.”
Adversely,
OXFORD
ONLINE
DICTIONARY
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/adversely (last visited Mar. 2,
2015);
Severely,
OXFORD
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/severely (last visited Mar. 2,
2015).
176. GDPR, supra note 8, art. 4(18), at 43; see also LIBE Draft, supra note 147, art.
4(18), at 67.
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contain definition of a child per se but includes a reference to a person
below the age of 13 under its Article 8(1). 177 Overall, Article 8(1) of all
the three drafts requires the consent of parents or legal guardian in order to process personal data of a child below the age of 13 if the basis for
the processing is based on the data subject‘s consent. This would imply
that when a breach of personal data happens that affects the data of
children below that age, the controller is required to notify the parents
or legal guardian of the children affected in addition to the children
themselves.
Third, unlike the Regulation 611/2013, which requires notification
to subscribers in certain cases, which might include legal persons, the
notification regime under the draft Regulation covers only natural persons. Furthermore, unlike Regulation 611/2013 that provides a detailed
description regarding the exemptions for notifying the individual data
subjects, the initial Commission draft and the LIBE draft adopt a very
general approach without any reference to specific technological
measures in rendering data unintelligible. 178 This might be because of
the issues of technological neutrality in making specific reference to encryption or hashing within the Regulation 611/2013. However, the
Council draft refers to encryption, or pseudonymization, as mechanisms
that can be employed to render personal data unintelligible. 179 Given
that encryption is one technique of pseudonymization, 180 the reference
to both terms seems to be redundant. Although not specifically referenced in Article 32, the use of anonymization would also exempt the
controller from notifying the data subjectsprovided the individual cannot be identified via the data. This flows from the general principle
that, if data is rendered ―non-personal‖ through anonymization the data
protection rules do not apply.181 Furthermore, the Council draft introduces further exceptions. Accordingly, the controller is not required to
notify the data subject where: (a) It has ―taken subsequent measures
which ensure that the data subjects‘ rights and freedoms are no longer
likely to be severely affected;‖182 or (b) If notification ―involves disproportionate effort, in particular owing to the number of cases involved‖ in
which case the controller can resort to public communications or similar
measures;183 (c) If the notification ―would adversely affect a substantial
177. Council Draft, supra note 147, art. 8(1), at 77.
178. LIBE Draft, supra note 8, art. 32(3), at 111.
179. Council Draft, supra note 147, art. 32(3)(a), at 131.
180. Eur. Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 107, at 20.
181. Council Directive 95/46, ¶26, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); see also GDPR supra
note 8, ¶23, at 23.
182. This might include for example if the controller is able to demonstrate that it
has recovered a lost data without any unauthorized access or alteration. GDPR supra note
8, art. 32(3)(b), at 131; Council Draft, supra note 147, art. 32(3)(b), at 131.
183. GDPR supra note 8, art. 32(3)(c), at 131; Council Draft, supra note 147, art.
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public interest.‖184
3.3. BREACH NOTIFICATION BY ‗MARKET OPERATORS‘: THE NIS DIRECTIVE
The main objective of the proposed NIS Directive is to ―ensure a
high common level of network and information security (NIS).‖ 185 More
precisely, the Directive aims to create ―a level playing field for businesses across the EU and to avoid a weakest link‖ and thereby improve
the Internet and the private networks and information systems, which
are vital for the functioning of the European societies and economies. 186
A prominent feature in the Directive is the obligation for businesses
providing critical services to report security incidents. The initial draft
from the Commission has undergone some changes including some proposed amendments from the European Parliament‘s Committee on the
Internal Market and Consumer Protection.187
Subject matter of the NIS Directive and the breach notification
requirement
Article 14(2) of the initial Commission draft requires Member
States to ―ensure that public administrations and market operators notify to the competent authority incidents having a significant impact on
the security of the core services they provide.‖188 However, the proposed
amendment introduced further details by stipulating that:
Member States shall implement mechanisms to ensure that market
operators, notify without undue delay to the competent authority or to
the single point of contact incidents having an impact on the security

32(3)(c), at 131. This could be approached in light of the discussions in Section 3.1.3 where
the controller does not have the contact details of the individual and obtaining such would
involve disproportionate effort.
184. GDPR supra note 8, art. 32(3)(d), at 132; Council Draft, supra note 147, art.
32(3)(d), at 132. This could involve, as discussed in Section 3.1.3, the situation in which
the notification to the individual might put at risk the proper investigation of the personal
data breach or other crimes.
185. Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, at 2.
186. DR. MARNIX DEKKER ET AL., EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, CLOUD
SECURITY INCIDENT REPORTING FRAMEWORK FOR REPORTING ABOUT MAJOR CLOUD
SECURITY
INCIDENTS
8
(Dec.
9
2013),
available
at
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/cloud-computing/incidentreporting-for-cloud-computing/at_download/fullReport.
187. Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection, Report on the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Measures to Ensure a
High Common Level of Network and Information Security Across the Union (Dec. 2, 2014)
[hereinafter Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection], available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A72014-0103+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
188. Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, at 24.
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or continuity of the core services they provide. Notification shall not
expose the notifying party to increased liability.189

Compared with all the above breach notification regimes, the NIS
Directive covers a wide range of actors under the name of ―market operators.‖ In addition to market operators, the initial text proposed by the
Commission covered public administrations. In the initial Commission
draft, the term ―market operators‖ is referred to include operators of
critical infrastructures and providers of information society services
(the non-exhaustive list of the latter includes e-commerce platforms, Internet payment gateways, Social networks, Search engines, Cloud computing services, and application stores).190 However, the amendment
from Parliament limits the scope of ―market operators‖ to providers of
infrastructures that are critical in a stricter sense and exclude its application to information society services and public administrations. Yet,
the Directive still entitles Member States to extend the application to
public administrations.191 The draft from the Parliament defines a
―market operator‖ as an:
Operator of infrastructure that are essential for the maintenance of
vital economic and societal activities in the fields of energy, transport,
banking, financial market infrastructures, internet exchange points,
food supply chain and health, and the disruption or destruction of
which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result
of the failure to maintain those functions, a non-exhaustive list of
which is set out in Annex II, insofar as the network and information
systems concerned are related to its core services.192

Annex II of the NIS Directive provides a non-exhaustive list of operators of critical infrastructure. This includes Banking (credit institutions in accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/CE), Financial
market infrastructures (stock exchanges and central counterparty clearing houses), Health sector (including hospitals, private clinics, and other entities involved in health care provisions), energy (electricity and
gas suppliers, Electricity and/or gas distribution system operators and
retailers for final consumers) and transport (air, maritime, and railways).193 The draft from the Parliament added the security and defense
sector into the list.194 Primarily, the breach notification requirements
apply to all market operators providing services within the EU. It is not
189.
53.
190.
191.
at 58.
192.
193.
194.
67-69.

Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, art. 14(2), at
Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, art. 3(8) & Annex II, at 19, 30.
Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, art. 14(8)(a),
Id. art. 3(8)(b), at 34.
Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, art. 3(8)(b) & Annex II, at 19, 30.
Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, Annex II, at
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clear from the Directive that whether the mere fact that an operator
has European customers is enough for the law to apply or whether an
establishment within one of the Member States is required. However,
the draft from the Parliament added that ―market operators not providing services in the [EU] may also report incidents on a voluntary basis.‖195
The breach notification requirement under the NIS Directive excludes three actors from its scope.196 First, undertakings providing public communication networks or publicly available electronic communication services within the meaning of Framework Directive are excluded.
This is mainly because such actors are required to report network
breaches under the Framework Directive.197 However, Article 1(a)(5) of
the draft from the Parliament provides that ―incident notifications referred to in Article 14 shall be without prejudice to the provisions and
obligations regarding personal data breach notifications set out in Article 4 of Directive 2002/58/EC and the Regulation (EU) No 611/2013.‖ 198
This implies that if an electronic communication service provider is an
operator of a critical infrastructure and sustains personal data breaches, it should comply with the requirements under Article 4 of Directive
2002/58/EC, Regulation 611/2013, and the NIS Directive. Second, trust
service providers, as defined in the eIDAS Regulation are excluded from
the scope of the NIS Directive. The rationale behind this is also related
to the introduction of breach notification requirements for trust providers under the eIDAS Regulation. Third, the Directive does not apply to
microenterprises.199 However, the draft from the Parliament qualifies
such exemption by extending the application of the Directive to microenterprises if they act as subsidiaries of market operators as defined
under Article 3(8)(b).200 Software developers and hardware manufacturers are also excluded from the application of the Directive. 201
Many experts from industry and government warned for the risk of
unnecessary costs due to national differences in implementing NIS in195. Id. art. 14(2)(c), at 55.
196. Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, art. 1(3), at 18.
197. See supra Section 3.1.1.
198. Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, art. 1(a)(5),
at 31.
199. Defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361, as constituting ―micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) made up of enterprises which employ fewer
than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million,
and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million.‖ Commission Recommendation 2003/361, title I art. 2, of May 6, 2003 Concerning the Definition of Micro,
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 2003, O.J. (124) 36, 39 (EC); see also Proposed NIS
Directive, supra note 4, art. 14(8), at 24.
200. Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, art. 14(8), at
58.
201. Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, at 14.
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cident reporting and potential overlap with the notifications under the
proposed GDPR. Particularly, the scope of the initial draft of the NIS
Directive from the Commission is so broad that it significantly overlaps
with the draft GDPR. This means information service providers such as
cloud computing services and online payment service would be subject
to the draft GDPR as well to Member States‘ implementation of the NIS
Directive. In this regard, Recital 31 of the NIS Directive requires minimizing the administrative burdens where the incidents also involve
personal data breaches by developing information exchange mechanisms and templates in order to avoid the need for two notification
templates. However, more work will need to be done to clarify how this
is to work in practice particularly to harmonize the implementation of
incident reporting provisions whenever possible.
Notification to National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) or public
Not every breach that is sustained by market operators has to be
reported. Rather only those that concern the network and information
systems that are related to the core service.202 This implies that a financial institution which is engaged in charity activities might sustain
breaches. In this case, unless there is another law that requires the financial institution to notify breaches, for example, data Protection Regulations, the organization is not required to notify such breaches under
the NIS Directive. This is because such charity activities are not related
to its core activity as a financial service.
The breach notification regime under the NIS Directive is very similar to the regime under the Framework Directive. 203 One instance of
such proximity to the Framework notification regime can be found in
the amendment from the Parliament that refers to ―incidents having
significant impact on the continuity of the core services they provide.‖ 204
This means the main focus of the breach notification is on incidents
having significant impact on the functionality or continuity of the services, as elaborated under Section 3.1.1. Article 3(8a) of the draft from
the Parliament defines ―incident having a significant impact‖ as an ―incident affecting the security and continuity of an information network
or system that leads to the major disruption of vital economic or societal
functions.‖205 Furthermore, the same paragraph of Article 14(2) in the

202. Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, art. 14(2), at 24; Comm. on Internal Mkt.
and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, art. 14(2), at 53.
203. See Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, art.
14(8), at 58. The committee states that the breach notification requirement uses ―indicators similar to those laid down in the ENISA Technical Guidelines on reporting incidents
for Directive 2009/140/EC.‖ Id. at 72.
204. Id. art. 14(2), at 53.
205. Id. art. 8a, at 34.
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draft from the Parliament indicates that in assessing significance of the
impact of an incident the following parameters should take into account: (a) ―The number of users whose core service is affected; (b) The
duration of the incident; and (c) Geographic spread with regard to the
area affected by the incident.‖206 This is in line with the criteria discussed in Section 3.1.1 regarding Framework Directive. Another addition by the Parliament into Article 14(2) is that the ―notification shall
not expose the notifying party to increased liability.‖ 207 This provision is
an attempt to ensure that notifying entities are not severely punished
for exposing more details of the breach or for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of notification.208 This emanates from the need
to avoid that potential sanctions should not dis-incentivize the notification of incidents and create adverse effects.
The initial draft from the Commission requires the notification to
be made to the competent national authorities designated by each
Member State to monitor the application of the Directive at a national
level.209 However, Article 6(4a) of draft from the Parliament added that
where a Union law provides for sector-specific supervisory or regulatory
body, the notification of incidents in accordance with Article 14(2) from
the market operators should be made to such authority. 210 This means,
for example, the financial authorities might be designated to deal with
notifications from the financial sector and the health authorities regarding health sector and transport authorities for the transport sector provided there is sector-specific Union law to that effect. The designation of
the sector specific regulator to handle the notification is logical because
such authorities are believed to possess a better understanding of the
threats and vulnerabilities, particular to their sector, and are therefore
in a better position to assess the impact of potential or current incidents
to their sector.
However, this could lead to a significant challenge where providers
that support different critical infrastructures might be required to notify all such authorities. In order to avoid such problem, Article 6(2a) requires that where a Member State designates more than one competent
authority, it shall designate a ―single point of contact on the security of
network and information systems.‖211 Moreover, Article 6(4a) underlines
the need for close coordination between the sector-specific regulatory
authority and the competent authorities or the single point of contact of
under Article 6(2)(a). These provisions avoid a duplication of notifica206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
40.
211.

Id. art. 14(2)(a-c), at 53-54.
Id. art. 14(2), at 53.
Id.
Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, art. 6(1-2), at 20.
Comm. on Internal Mkt. and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, art. 6(4a), at
Id. art. 6(2a), at 38.
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tions both to the competent authorities and single point of contact as
well as notification to different sector-specific authorities.
Unlike the initial draft from the Commission, which did not contain
any reference to the timeframe, the proposed amendment from Parliament added ―undue delay‖ to Article 14(2). Therefore, ―undue delay‖
should be approached as discussed in Section 3.1.3. The details about
the content and procedure are left for the implementations by Member
States; however, the discussions in the above sections regarding these
aspects are generally relevant. Furthermore, Article 14(2a) of the draft
from the Parliament further adds that the notification should be made
to the competent authority where the core services are affected. 212 If the
core services in ―more than one Member State are affected, the single
point of contact which has received the notification shall, based on the
information provided by the market operator, alert the single points of
contact in other Member States.‖213 It is not clear whether this provision is establishing a single notification regime for providers operating
in many Member States and if so, which Member State‘s single point of
contact should be notified. Furthermore, Article 14(2)(a) of the draft
from the Parliament indicates that ―Market operators shall notify the
incidents referred in paragraphs 1 and 2.‖214 The reference to paragraph
1 seems to imply that operators have to notify risks that are identified
under Article 14(1). This might be the case given Article 14(1) of the
same draft requires operators to take measures to detect and effectively
manage risks.
Once the notification is received, the competent authority, after
consultation with the market operators, might inform the public about
the incidents if it is determined that public awareness is necessary. According to the addition in the draft from the Parliament, such awareness is deemed to be necessary if the notification to the public enables
to prevent an incident or deal with an ongoing incident, or where that
market operator that sustained the breach has ―refused to address a serious structural vulnerability related to that incident without undue delay.‖215 However, the authorities shall balance the public interest with
the interest of the market operator including the possible use of anonymous notification and putting in place appropriate procedural safeguards where the operator is given the opportunity to be heard before
going public.

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. art. 14(2a), at 54.
Id. art. 14(2a), at 54-55.
Id. art. 14(2a), at 54.
Id. art. 14(4), at 56.
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3.4. BREACH NOTIFICATION BY ‗TRUST SERVICE PROVIDERS‘: THE EIDAS
REGULATION
The eIDAS, which will replace the existing Electronic Signature Directive 1999/93/EC,216 was adopted by the European legislators on 23
July 2014.217 As the name indicates the Directive from 1999 essentially
focuses on electronic signatures excluding providers of other types of
certificates, or complementary services related to electronic certificates
but not oriented to electronic signatures such as seals or time stamps,
website authentication certificates. Therefore, the Regulation extends
the concept of certification services further from electronic signatures to
any type of electronic certificates. The main objective of the Regulation
is to enhance trust and provide legal certainty for secure and smooth
electronic interactions between businesses, citizens and public authorities and thereby increase the effectiveness of public and private online
services in the EU.218 More generally, the main goals of the Regulation
could be summarized: (1) Ensuring mutual recognition and acceptance
of electronic identification across borders; (2) To give legal effect and
mutual recognition to trust services; (3) Enhancing current rules on esignatures; (4) Providing a legal framework for electronic seals, time
stamping, electronic document acceptability, electronic delivery and
website authentication; (5) Ensuring minimal security level of trust
services providers systems; and (6) Enforcing obligation of notifications
about security incidents for trust services providers. 219
Subject matter of the eIDAS Regulation and the breach notification
requirement
The Regulation, under Article 2, lays down two primary legal
grounds for its application. First, the Regulation applies to electronic
identification schemes that have been notified by a Member State and
recognized by the Commission upon fulfillment of certain conditions as
stipulated under Articles 7-9. Second, the Regulation applies to trust
service providers established within the Union. Article 3(16) of the Regulation defines ―trust service‖ as:
‗an electronic service normally provided for remuneration‘ consisting of the following:
216. Directive 1999/93, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, 1999 O.J. (L 13) 12 (EC).
217. Regulation 910/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73 (EU) (eIDAS Regulation).
218. Regulation 910/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73 (EU).
219. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the
Internal Market, COM (2012) 238 final (June 4, 2012), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0238:FIN:EN:PDF.
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(a) the creation, verification, and validation of electronic signatures,
electronic seals or electronic time stamps, electronic registered delivery
services and certificates related to those services, or
(b) the creation, verification and validation of certificates for website
authentication; or
(c) the preservation of electronic signatures, seals or certificates related to those services.220

This definition brings a wide array of actors into its realm including
companies specialized in the subject of certification and electronic signatures as well as businesses, ―whose core activities lie elsewhere but
offer and certification and trust services as value-added services to the
benefits of their clients.‖221 The use of the phrase ―normally provided for
remuneration‖ implies that only services provided on a commercial basis are subject to the legislation although remuneration does not have to
be in the form of direct payments. 222 This excludes the provision of trust
services, which have no effect on third parties such as ―systems set up
in businesses or public administrations to manage internal procedures
making use of trust services.‖223
In accordance with the precedents of the Court of Justice for the
European Union (CJEU), a trust service provider would be considered
to have an establishment within the EU, if it has effective and real exercise of activity in a Member State through stable arrangements irrespective of the legal form of such an establishment, whether simply
branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality. 224 Furthermore, some
trust services provided by trust providers established outside the EEA
might be recognized through ―an agreement concluded between the Union and the third country in question or an international organization
in accordance with Article 218 TFEU.‖225 This implies that the requirements of the Regulation will be applicable, through their inclusion in
the agreements, to the trust providers established outside the Union.
The eIDAS Regulation regulates the notification of breaches by
trust service providers as defined under Article 3(16). The Regulation
makes a distinction between qualified and non-qualified trust service
220.
221.

Regulation 910/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73 (EU).
JOSHUA BUDD ET AL., EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLE 15 OF THE DRAFT REGULATION ON ELECTRONIC IDENTIFICATION AND TRUSTED
SERVICES FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 7 (Dec. 19 2012),
available
at
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-andtrust/library/deliverables/implementation-of-article-15/at_download/fullReport.
222. Regulation 910/2014, art. 3(16), 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73, 84 (EU).
223. Id. at 76.
224. Case 168/84, Gunter Berkholz v Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte-Altstadt, 1985
E.C.R.
2251,
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61984CJ0168&from=EN.
225. Regulation 910/2014, art. 14(1), 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73, 92 (EU).
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providers. Generally non-qualified trust service providers are subject to
lighter obligations within the Regulation. However, the breach notification requirement applies to any trust service provider regardless of
whether it is qualified or not. In this regard, Article 19 contains two
kinds of notifications. The first relates to the notification of risks that
might have ―adverse effects‖ to the security of the trust services. This
flows form the obligation of the trust service providers to take appropriate measures commensurate to the degree of risk. This requirement is
similar to the notification of ―particular risk‖ under the ePrivacy Directive as discussed above. Once the providers are able to identify that a
certain security incident might have adverse effect, they have to inform
the relevant stakeholders including the users and supervisory authorities.226 Furthermore, Article 19(2) of the Regulation stipulates that
trust service providers:
[S]hall, without undue delay but in any event within 24 hours after
having become aware of it, notify the supervisory body and, where applicable, other relevant bodies, such as the competent national body
for information security or the data protection authority, of any
breach of security or loss of integrity that has a significant impact on
the trust service provided or on the personal data maintained therein.227

Notification to National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs)
A further distinction can be made between two kinds of breaches
under Article 19(2) of the Regulation. The first breach concerns any
breach of security or loss of integrity that has a significant impact on the
trust service provided. This terminology is similar to Article 13a of the
Framework Directive. Therefore, discussion regarding the kind of
breach to be notified is equally applicable for this breach. In other
words, the focus of the breaches is mainly on the functionality or continuity of the services and the ―significance‖ is determined having regard
to the number of customers‘ affected, geographical coverage, and the
length of the incident. However, ―breaches affecting trust services‖
could have more severe ramifications as ―they may result in the loss of
trust in the digital identity of a natural person or a legal entity.‖ 228 In
addition, unlike the notification within the Framework Directive which
excludes its application to the physical kit such as telecom equipment,
the breaches under the eIDAS Regulation might emanate from breaches
affecting, for example, IT equipment (misplaced or stolen equipment
laptops or USB sticks).
The second kind of breach constitutes breach of security or loss of in226.
227.
228.

Id. art. 19(1), at 95.
Id.
BUDD ET AL., supra note 221, at 19.
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tegrity that has a significant impact on the personal data maintained.
Under the Regulation 611/2013 we have noted that any kind of personal
data breach regardless of its significance has to be notified to the relevant authorities. However, Article 19(2) seems to qualify the notification of such breaches only if it has ―a significant impact on the personal
data maintained.‖229 This contradicts the requirements under both the
Regulation 611/2013 and the draft GDPR that require notification of
any personal data breach, even very small incidents, to data protection
authorities. However, Recital 11 of the eIDAS Regulation indicates that
the Regulation should be applied in full compliance with the principles
relating to the protection of personal data provided for in Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. This implies
that once the breach affects personal data, Regulations 611/2013 and
the GDPR will have an upper hand on their application. Thus, any
breach of personal data has to be notified to the data protection authorities in accordance with the Regulation 611/2013 and draft GDPR regardless of its impact. According to Article 19(2), such notification has
to be made both to the competent supervisory authority designated by
the Member State to handle matters on trust providers and the Data
Protection Authority. This might give rise to multiple notifications by
some providers under the eIDAS Regulation, draft GDPR and possibly
the NIS Directive. Taking PayPal as an example, a security breach affecting its service might need to be reported under the eIDAS Regulation (as provider of trust services such as DocuSign eSignatures), under
the GDPR (as data controller of personal data) and possibly under the
NIS Directive (as operator of financial services that are considered critical infrastructure). Such breaches have to be notified to the relevant
supervisory body without undue delay but in any event within 24 hours
after having become aware of it. This provision in particular makes it
clear that the use of the term ―undue delay‖ within the notification regimes represent that the notification should be given immediately.
Notification to individuals or legal person
Paragraph 2 of Article 19(2) states that:
Where the breach of security or loss of integrity is likely to adversely
affect a natural or legal person to whom the trusted service has been
provided, the trust service provider shall also notify the natural or legal person of the breach of security or loss of integrity without undue
delay.230

This is essentially similar to the requirements under Article 3(1) of
Regulation 611/2013. Thus, the assessment of whether a security
229.
230.

Regulation 910/2014, art. 19(2), 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73, 95 (EU).
Id.
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breach adversely affects the individual has to be made in the same
manner as discussed in Section 3.1.3. This notwithstanding, unlike Article 3(1) of Regulation 611/2013, the adverse effect under the eIDAS
Regulation is not only limited to privacy or personal data concerns but
also includes breaches affecting loss of trust in the digital identity of a
natural person or a legal entity. In addition, the eIDAS Regulation covers the notification of breaches to legal persons.
3.5. NOTIFICATION OF BREACHES WHEN USING THIRD PARTY PROVIDERS
One notable pattern in the emerging breach notification requirements is the introduction of obligations on third party provider to inform and alert actors subject to breach notification requirements. One
of the main challenges for enforcement of breach notification requirements is the disclosure disincentive. As noted above, such disincentive
is particularly strong when there is third party involvement, such as
cloud providers, in undertaking certain operations, for example in relation to billing or management functions, on behalf of the provider. In
such a case where a data breach occurs at the third party provider, the
third party provider is not under obligation to notify the regulatory authorities or the end users regarding the breach. However, both Regulation 611/2013 and the proposed GDPR try to mitigate by introducing obligations on the third party to inform the provider. For example, Article
5 of Regulation 611/2013 requires the third party provider to ―alert and
inform the provider with which it has a direct contractual relationship.‖231 This applies, for example, in the context of wholesale provision
of electronic communications services, when typically the wholesale
provider does not have a direct contractual relationship with the end
user. In such a case, the wholesale provider should inform the retail
provider, which in turn should notify the end users. Similarly, Article
31(2) of the proposed GDPR requires the processor to "alert and inform
the controller without undue delay after the establishment of a personal
data breach."232
It has to be noted that the involvement of a third party provider
does not reduce any of the conditions regarding, timeframe, and content
to be complied with. Therefore, it is recommended that the obligation of
the third party provider to notify the provider immediately if a personal
data breach occurs be set out in a contract. Nevertheless, given that
many third party providers‘ offer non-negotiable standard terms of service, it may be difficult to negotiate such notifications into the contracts
for many controllers, particularly SMEs. Where contracts are negotiable, such contract should include an obligation on the third party pro-
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vider to provide any information that the provider is required to provide
in its notification to the authorities and affected individuals. To the extent possible, the contract should also address the party responsible to
bear the notification costs, legal costs, and investigation costs. The challenge with third party providers, such as cloud providers is that sometimes it might be not easy for the provider to know whether certain
breach affects personal data of its customers. For example, providers of
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS)
might not be aware of whether their infrastructure is handling personal
data.233 Furthermore, regarding the requirements under the proposed
GDPR, making distinction between controller and processor appears to
be a challenging task in cloud computing scenarios. Some commentators
suggest that one way of dealing with such challenge is to adopt the ―intermediary liability‖ approach within the e-Commerce Directive where
only controllers should be responsible. 234 This would also imply that the
obligation to inform the controller might be triggered once the third
party provider is aware that it is handling personal data. Furthermore,
a survey by ENISA on cloud security incident reporting stresses the importance of anonymity through legal protection or non-disclosure
agreements in encouraging breach disclosure by cloud providers. 235
Therefore, further implementing measures from the Commission and
Member States on breach notifications should give due consideration of
such measures for notifying breaches under certain circumstances.
Although the amendments from the Parliament to the NIS Directive have excluded the application of the Directive to information
service providers such as cloud computing providers, cloud service providers might still be subject to the Directive. This could be where the
cloud computing services are used by ―operators of critical infrastructure to support the delivery of their core services‖ or where the cloud
computing services are critical in themselves. 236 In the first case scenario, the cloud providers have to notify the critical infrastructure operator
regarding the breaches so that the latter could notify the relevant authorities. In the second case, the cloud providers themselves have to notify the competent national authorities. Nevertheless, this raises many
controversial issues. First, it is often hard for the cloud provider, particularly IaaS and PaaS providers, to know the number of end-users
and organizations depending on the cloud services. This means it is ―dif233. DR. MARNIX DEKKER ET AL., EUR. NETWORK & INFO.
SECURITY INCIDENT REPORTING FRAMEWORK FOR REPORTING
SECURITY INCIDENTS, supra note 186.
234. Hon et al., supra note 164, at 39.
235. DR. MARNIX DEKKER ET AL., EUR. NETWORK & INFO.
SECURITY INCIDENT REPORTING FRAMEWORK FOR REPORTING
SECURITY INCIDENTS, supra note 186, at 17.
236. Id. at 10.
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ficult to measure the impact of incidents or the criticality of a service in
terms of the number of end-users, because the number of end-users
cannot be easily estimated by the service provider‖ or due to a chain of
actors.237 The reason behind is that the cloud provider might not be
aware of what kind of service or data is used over its infrastructure by
the customer and how critical such service might be. Second, to the extent that cloud services can be used by the energy, transport, banking,
financial market, and health sector, a challenge could be that if a cloud
services, which is considered to be critical in itself, offers services for all
these sectors, which would be the appropriate organ for the cloud provider to report the breaches to, i.e. Financial regulator, Energy regulator, or ―in general the public bodies that have a regulatory mandate
that includes networks and information security.‖ 238 Third, the distributed nature of cloud services means many Member States might be involved in the provision of a specific service, making it difficult ―to determine where such incidents should be reported.‖239
4. DEALING WITH THE COMPLEXITY OF BREACH
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
One of the rationales for breach notification requirements is to enhance transparency of organization on data security. Transparency is
also related to data security and risk management. In the above discussions we have noted that the relevant actors subject to the Regulation
611/2013, the proposed GDPR, the proposed NIS Directive and the eIDAS Regulation are required to take measures that are commensurate
to the risks presented. Furthermore, a risk management framework is
an essential part of the proposed NIS Directive where organizations are
required to have a methodology and criteria for identifying, evaluation,
prioritization and treatment of risk as well as for assessing the impact
of potential incidents.240 Similarly, both the Framework Directive and
the eIDAS Regulation contain provisions for the notification of particular risks to the users of the services, clearly showing that a risk assessment and an appropriate risk management framework is an important
consideration with in such legislations regulating breach notifications.
This implies that companies should define in advance appropriate plans
to deal with breach notification requirements, which can ensure that
they respond quickly and effectively to security incidents.241 Given that
237. Id. at 11.
238. Id. at 23.
239. Id. at 20.
240. Proposed NIS Directive, supra note 4, art. 5(2), at 20; Comm. on Internal Mkt.
and Consumer Protection, supra note 187, art. 5(2)(a).
241. RECOMMENDATIONS ON TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES OF ARTICLE 4,
supra note 97, at 6.
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security risk analysis is an integral part of the notification requirements, addressing breach notification requirements in conjunction with
the security risk analysis would benefit organizations in a number of
ways.
First, risk management enables organizations to identify risks in
advance and thereby decrease the possibility of unexpected events to
occur.242 Research shows that it is cheaper for corporations to be proactive in their efforts to prevent data breaches rather than react after it
happens.243 On the one hand, organizations will be able to identify the
possible risks and take measures to prevent them, meaning the need to
comply with breach notification requirements would not arise. On the
other hand, organizations will be better prepared in detecting and reporting the breaches rapidly. More particularly, addressing breach notification requirements in conjunction with security risk analysis would
enable organizations for assessing which of the identified security incidents, if materialized, needs notification to the authorities or both to
the authorities and individual. Second, the security risk analysis becomes essential when looking at the content of the notification that the
regimes require. At least in cases of personal data breaches, the security risk analysis is essential in providing inputs such as the nature of
the data that has been breached (financial, health, etc.), nature of the
breach (widespread, or an isolated incident; technical, human error, or
theft), and security level (has the data been encrypted). Attaching the
data breach notification requirement to security risk analysis would enable organizations to import such content easily from the latter. Similarly, the security risk analysis will be useful in making decisions such
as whether an incident will have ―a significant impact‖ on the security
of networks or services so that the breach notification requirement under the Framework Directive, the NIS Directive, and eIDAS Regulation
need to be complied. Related with this, ENISA‘s methodology for assessing the adverse effect of a breach on the rights of individuals, discussed in Section 3.1.3, would be simpler to use if compliance with the
breach notification requirement is aligned with the security risk analysis.
Third, considering data breach notification requirements during security risk analysis is particularly important because such laws require
organizations give notice of the breach within a matter of hours or at
most a few days. However, if organizations manage to address such
compliance issues in advance during the security risk analysis, it would
avoid a possible last minute rush and confusion in determining which
risks to report once a security breach occurs. Therefore, organizations
242. PEDRO VICENTE & MIGUEL M. DA SILVA, A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR
INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE, RISK AND COMPLIANCE 204 (H. Mouratidis ed., 2011).
243. Michael E. Jones, Comment, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public
and Private Sectors, 3 J.L. & POL‘Y INFO. SOC‘Y 555, 580 (2007).
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need to ―navigate the dense fabric of security breach notification requirements of various locations and jurisdictions and identify the relevant risks.‖244 During such risk analysis, measures should be put in
place such as establishing a communication channel between the security experts and legal/compliance team when a security breach occurs so
that the organization can comply with the notification requirements in
the given timeframe.
5. CONCLUSION
The prominence of information technology in day-to-day life means
that businesses‘ ICT infrastructures attract great interest from both
cyber-criminals and legislators. Businesses have to deal not only with
the increased cyber-attacks, but also with an array of increasingly complex laws dealing with information security. The emergence of a number of regulatory instruments containing breach notification requirements within the EU and around the globe is a reflection of such
reality. At present there are four regulatory instruments, which are already in force and two proposed legislations containing breach notification requirements in the EU. This article studies the emerging and existing breach notification requirements in the EU in a way that shows
their overlap, areas of conflict, and the resulting complexity in compliance with such requirements. In this regard, the article examines two
existing, two newly implemented, and two en route laws containing
breach notification requirements. It also highlights the challenges in
the effective implementation of such rules. Furthermore, the article underlines the need to adopt a proactive approach to compliance with
breach notification requirements. Particularly, given the emergence of
legislative instruments requiring for conducting security risk analysis,
addressing breach notification requirements in conjunction with security risk analysis would significantly ease organizations‘ compliance with
such requirements in reporting breaches quickly and effectively.
The article also shows that there is significant convergence among
the different notification regimes – existing and emerging. More particularly, the breach notification requirements under the Framework Directive, the NIS Directive, and the eIDAS Regulation are essentially
similar. Such requirements focus on breaches that affect the functionality or continuity of a network or services and these regimes require such
breaches to have significant impact on the network or services, which is
determined having regard to the number of customers‘ affected, geographical coverage and the length the incident lasts. Likewise, the notification regimes under the Regulation 611/2013 and proposed GDPR are
essentially similar. They focus on the notification of personal data
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breach notifications to regulatory authorities and to individuals. Under
both regimes, the regulatory authorities should be notified of any kind
of personal data breach regardless of its impact. However, the notification to the individuals or subscribers adopts a risk-based trigger which
requires a ―likely adverse effect‖ on the rights of the subscriber or individual. In addition, the ePrivacy Directive and the eIDAS Regulation
contain provisions for the notification of ―risks‖ to customers that might
have an adverse effect on the services of the provider.
In some sense, the convergence among the different regimes contributes positively in the understanding of the breach requirements and
in gearing the notification regimes in a similar direction. However, such
overlap means that the same breach within a company might have to be
brought to the attention of a number of different regulatory authorities,
and following different timeframes and procedures. For example, the
Commission draft of the NIS Directive applies to information service
providers such as cloud providers and online payment services. This
significantly overlaps with the draft GDPR, which means information
service providers, would be subject to the proposed GDPR as well to
Member States‘ implementation of the NIS Directive. This might create
complexity in compliance and considerable administrative costs for providers operating cross-border. Overall, although a greater convergence
among the regimes is positive and commendable, more work need to be
done in terms of creating stronger collaboration among the different
regulatory authorities or creating a single point of contact for notification by providers that are subject to different notification regimes.
In addition, a notable trend among the notification regimes is that
third party providers, such as cloud providers, are obliged to inform the
main providers subject to the breach notification. Although this is a
good approach in mitigating the disclosure disincentive for such providers, sometimes it might be difficult for the third party providers to know
that their customers have such an obligation. For example, an IaaS
provider might not be aware that its customer is handling personal data
on its infrastructure and is subject to the Regulation 611/2013 or the
GDPR. So there are suggestions for the ―intermediary liability‖ approach where such third parties would be responsible only based on
their actual knowledge. Furthermore, although the need for anonymous
notification channels has been underlined by cloud providers, such
measure has hardly caught any attention in the notification regimes
and need to be explored.

